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Abstract
Despite their natural resources, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) have failed
to live up to their economic potential, primarily due to their dependence on a revenue
source with volatile prices and political significance in an unstable region. This thesis
argues that the best way to convert oil wealth into consistent long term growth is through
diversification, both by investing in foreign assets and by growing domestic sectors that
are independent from oil and gas prices. The research further investigates the primary
tool these countries have used to do so – sovereign wealth funds – and how their
implementation and structures have impacted their effectiveness in achieving economic
diversification and growth.
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Introduction
In the early 1970s, most countries in the Gulf region experienced exceptional
economic growth due to their newly discovered oil and gas resources and a spike in oil
prices. This caused many to see the oil-exporters of the Gulf as full of economic and
geopolitical potential. During this peak, infant mortality in the Gulf was halved, life
expectancy rose, and adult literacy increased dramatically. 1 Forty years later, most of
those countries have struggled with domestic instability and the economic growth that
was once so promising has stagnated and declined. 2 The Gulf countries’ failure to rise
has meant a significant loss of economic potential, increased global instability, and
ultimately the loss of thousands of lives. 3 Many theories have attempted to explain the
MENA countries’ stagnation and decline, blaming poor leadership, the “resource curse,”
corruption, religious sectarianism, colonial history, population growth, etc. Though these
theories may each explain some aspects of individual countries’ decline, they have fallen
short of generating feasible policy recommendations.
One of the most indisputable characteristics of the Gulf Cooperation Council
countries (Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) is
that a large portion of their gross domestic product (GDP) comes from oil and gas
revenues. These revenues are in turn highly dependent on oil and gas prices, which are
extremely volatile and responsive to international instability. Dependency on such a
1
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volatile source of income makes it extremely difficult for these countries to plan for the
future and manage their wealth efficiently; they have historically over-spent during times
of oil windfalls, leaving themselves vulnerable to oil price shocks like that of the early
1980s or to regional turmoil, as in the Gulf War. This uncertainty in turn leads to a
volatile domestic market, reduced long term investment both from domestic and foreign
sources, and more economic and political instability. This thesis will examine one of the
most common tools used to promote for stabilization and growth – sovereign wealth
funds – how they have been implemented in different countries, and how their
characteristics have led to their success or failure, particularly as regards their compliance
with the Santiago Principles.

Introduction to Sovereign Wealth Funds
Since the oil price boom of the 1970s, oil and natural gas exporting countries in
the Gulf region have faced a number of challenges when dealing with their natural
resource wealth. These challenges are, to a certain extent, unavoidable, but the policies
put in place by individual governments can have an immense impact on their effects. An
increasingly popular approach to stabilizing government revenue in the face of price
instability is the “sovereign wealth fund,” which generally takes a certain percentage of
domestic commodity revenue, invests it in a diversified portfolio, and therefore mitigates
the overall risk inherent in having a large amount of wealth focused in one type of
investment.
In 1953, the first sovereign wealth fund was formed in Kuwait as a way to invest
oil wealth in a diversified portfolio and thereby reduce the Kuwaiti economy’s

2

dependence on oil revenues. 4 In total, the KIA currently manages about US$592 billion
which is either invested in long-term, low risk international portfolios or in the domestic
economy. 5 In 1986 government income from investments started to exceed oil revenue
and it has continued to display strong returns, with the Kuwait Investment Office acting
as the country’s central bank. Despite a few incidents of mismanagement, it has reduced
volatility, released cash for domestic projects, and acted as a back-up source of
government funds when assets are frozen, as in the 1990 invasion by Iraq. 6
Since 1952, hundreds of other sovereign wealth funds have been formed, both to
manage oil revenues and other revenue windfalls in a variety of countries around the
world. 7 Over 40 of these funds were formed since 2005, showing a renewed interest in
this method of managing government wealth, particularly in the Gulf Region. As defined
by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, a sovereign wealth fund is:
“is a state-owned investment fund or entity that is commonly established
from balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations,
the proceeds of privatizations, governmental transfer payments, fiscal
surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from resource exports. The definition
of sovereign wealth fund excludes, among other things, foreign currency
reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of
payments or monetary policy purposes, state-owned enterprises in the

4
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traditional sense, government-employee pension funds, or assets managed
for the benefit of individuals.” 8
This definition can include stabilization funds, savings/future generations funds, pension
reserve funds, reserve investment funds, and strategic development sovereign wealth
funds; each of which can be funded either through revenue from commodity exports or
through government budget surpluses. This thesis will primarily examine savings and
strategic development funds in the oil-exporting countries of the Gulf, their legal
framework, how they have been managed since their formation, where their funds are
spent domestically and internationally, and their abilities to promote stable economic
growth through diversification away from dependence on oil wealth.
One of the biggest challenges in studying these funds is the lack of transparency
regarding their sizes, asset allocations, and spending patterns. The Sovereign Wealth
Fund Institute uses the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index to rank sovereign wealth
funds on a scale from 1-10, with 1 being the least transparent and 10 being the most
transparent (see Figure 1). Based on their rankings, only two of the oil-exporting gulf
countries (Bahrain and the UAE) have funds that exceed the 8-point minimum needed to
qualify as “adequately transparent,” and even then, only half of the UAE’s funds pass the
test. 9

8
9
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Figure 1: Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency Rankings (as of April 2015) 10
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Source: The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute Linaburg-Maduell Index

Since these commodity-based sovereign wealth funds are so secretive about their
assets under management and where the assets are invested, nearly all information about
them is speculative. In 2007, Morgan Stanley published an article titled “How Big Could
Sovereign Wealth Funds Be by 2015?” and concluded that they could reach US$12
trillion by 2015, about 50 percent of which will come from oil-exporting countries,
although that includes Russia, Norway, and other oil-exporters outside the Gulf with
sovereign wealth funds. 11 In 2009, Deutsche Bank estimated that the total assets under

10
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management of commodity-based sovereign wealth funds amounted to about US$1.65
trillion, making up an estimated 1.5 percent of the total assets in the global banking
sector, 2.5 percent of world GDP, and 115 percent of total hedge fund assets when the
study was published. 12 The report further stated that the total commodity sovereign
wealth fund estimate of US$1.65 trillion would likely increase to US$7 trillion by 2019. 13
US$1.2 trillion of the originally estimated US$1.65 trillion in assets under management
was attributed to Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait. To put this in perspective, the
combined GDPs of these three countries in 2009 was US$2.542 trillion. It should be
noted that these estimates were made while oil prices were much higher than they
currently are, so the researchers assumed oil-producing countries would have higher
revenues to add to the sovereign wealth funds than they currently do.
This report shows that the investments of sovereign wealth funds can not only
have a massive impact on the world economy, but they control a significant portion of the
wealth in these countries, and how they are managed is crucial to the countries’ success.
In order to clarify what exactly good management is, the Santiago Principles were laid
out in 2008 by the International Monetary Fund and the International Working Group of
Sovereign Wealth Funds. These principles are as follows:

1. The legal framework for the sovereign wealth fund should be sound and support
its effective operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s).

12
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2. The policy purpose of the sovereign wealth fund should be clearly defined and
publicly disclosed.
3. Where the sovereign wealth fund’s activities have significant direct domestic
macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely coordinated with
the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure consistency with the
overall macroeconomic policies.
4. There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or
arrangements in relation to the sovereign wealth fund’s general approach to
funding, withdrawal, and spending operations.
5. The relevant statistical data pertaining to the sovereign wealth fund should be
reported on a timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion
where appropriate in macroeconomic data sets.
6. The governance framework for the sovereign wealth fund should be sound and
establish a clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to
facilitate accountability and operational independence in the management of the
sovereign wealth fund to pursue its objectives.
7. The owner should set the objectives of the sovereign wealth fund, appoint the
members of its governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined
procedures, and exercise oversight over the sovereign wealth fund’s operations.
8. The governing boy(ies) should act in the best interest of the sovereign wealth
fund, and have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry
out its functions.

7

9. The operational management of the sovereign wealth fund should implement the
sovereign wealth fund’s strategies in an independent manner and in accordance
with clearly defined responsibilities.
10. The accountability framework for the sovereign wealth fund’s operations should
be clearly defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive
documents, or management agreement.
11. An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the sovereign wealth
fund’s operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in
accordance with recognized international or national accounting standards in a
consistent manner.
12. The sovereign wealth fund’s operations and financial statements should be
audited annually in accordance with recognized international or national
accounting standards in a consistent manner.
13. Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made known to
the members of the sovereign wealth fund’s governing body(ies), management,
and staff.
14. Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the sovereign wealth fund’s
operational management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and
follow clear rules and procedures.
15. Sovereign wealth fund operations and activities in host countries should be
conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure
requirements of the countries in which they operate.

8

16. The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which the
sovereign wealth fund’s management is operationally independent from the
owner, should be publically disclosed.
17. Relevant financial information regarding the sovereign wealth fund should be
publicly disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to
contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in
recipient countries.
18. The sovereign wealth fund’s investment policy should be clear and consistent
with its defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the
owner or the governing body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio management
principles.
19. The sovereign wealth fund’s investment decisions should aim to maximize riskadjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and
based on economic and financial grounds.
20. The sovereign wealth fund should not seek or take advantage of privileged
information or inappropriate influence by the broader government in competing
with private entities.
21. Sovereign wealth funds view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental
element of their equity investments’ value. If a sovereign wealth fund chooses to
exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its
investment policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The
sovereign wealth fund should publicly disclose its general approach to voting
securities of listed entities, including the key factors guiding
9

22. The sovereign wealth fund should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and
manages the risks of its operations.
23. The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to benchmarks, if
any) of the sovereign wealth fund should be measured and reported to the owner
according to clearly defined principles or standards.
24. A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be
engaged in by or on behalf of the sovereign wealth fund. 14

The purpose of the Santiago Principles is to encourage not only transparency, but the type
of institutional framework that will promote sound investment practices and a focus on
long-term economic growth. As such, it encourages strict legal guidelines on withdrawals
from sovereign wealth funds, specific requirements regarding contributions to the fund by
the government, and accountability through external audits and public disclosures.
According to the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, abiding by
these guidelines will not only increase stability, but will also gain these sovereign wealth
funds respect in the international financial community, in turn encouraging “an open and
stable investment climate” with minimal protectionism. 15
In addition to analyzing the unique economic challenges that face the Gulf
Cooperation Council countries, the following chapters will examine their sovereign
wealth funds with respect to their transparency, compliance with the Santiago Principles,

14
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and how their investments have impacted both government revenues and domestic
growth.

11

Chapter 1: Kuwait
Founded in 1953, eight years before Kuwait’s independence, the Kuwait
Investment Authority is the world’s oldest sovereign wealth fund. At the time of its
founding, Kuwait was severely underdeveloped, but the Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem had
the forethought to establish a fund with a mission to “achieve long term investment
returns on financial reserves… providing an alternative to oil reserves, which would
enable Kuwait’s future generations to face the uncertainties ahead with greater
confidence.” 16 As of 1976, the fund has been separated into two parts: the General
Reserve Fund and the Future Generations Fund. 17 The General Reserve Fund serves as
the treasurer and stabilization fund of the country as well as the primary repository of the
state’s oil revenues. It also is mandated to invest solely within Kuwait, other MENA
countries, and hard currency assets rather than more risky international investments. In
order for the Kuwaiti government to withdraw funds from the General Reserve Fund, the
withdrawal must be approved in an annual budget passed by Parliament, making this fund
a secure savings fund with a focus on long-term domestic stability and growth. 18
The Future Generations Fund, on the other hand, is invested solely outside of
Kuwait, in a variety of investment vehicles including typical stocks and bonds and
alternative investments, including private equity, real estate and infrastructure. This
allows the Future Generations Fund to focus less on internal development and more on
creating steady revenues that will benefit Kuwait over a long-term investment horizon.
16
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When it was founded in 1976, 50 percent of the General Reserve Fund’s assets were
transferred to the Future Generations Fund, and every year since then at least 10 percent
of the General Reserve Fund’s net profits have been added to the Future Generations
Fund as well as 10 percent of state revenues, much of which comes from oil revenues. In
order to withdraw any of these funds, special legislation must be passed. 19 Both of these
funds have strict regulations on contributions to and withdrawals from the funds by the
government, fulfilling the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds’
recommended policy-making guidelines as specified in the Santiago Principles, though
these funds fall short of full compliance in other ways, including their transparency
standards. 20
A large part of the Kuwait Investment Fund’s sustained success is its relative
independence from domestic politics, which is also highly recommended in the Santiago
Principles. To reduce the likelihood of major conflicts of interest between the Kuwait
Investment Authority and officials with alternative agendas, the board consists of the
Minister of Finance, the Minister of Oil, the Governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait, the
Under Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, and five other Kuwaiti nationals from the
private sector, three of whom may not hold any other public office. From this board, a
Managing Director and deputies are selected, and the people holding these positions are
not allowed to hold any other government positions or work for any other employers
while serving. The presence of officials from the Ministry of Finance and the Central
Bank is intended to insure that management of the fund prioritizes long term growth

19
20
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rather than rash spending, though the latter choice would be beneficial to other
government officials trying to gain domestic support through unnecessary subsidies,
ostentatious government projects, etc. Though there will be times when people on the
board do want try to withdraw funds for projects, the goal in choosing this type of board
is that it will only do so when the Kuwaiti economy truly needs to be propped up in order
to reduce domestic volatility.
The Kuwait Investment Authority has not always been successful in its mission to
separate bank and state, leading to scandals involving risky deals, fraudulent behavior,
and large losses. For example, in the late 1980’s, Spain’s economy experienced a boom,
and the KIO (the London-based office of the Kuwait Investment Authority) invested
heavily in various Spanish industries, including Torras Hostench, a paper maker which
subsequently acquired multiple other companies, becoming the conglomerate known as
Grupo Torras. 21 The KIO’s total investment in Grupo Torras was estimated to be over
US$5 billion, making it one of the Kuwait Investment Authority’s largest and most risky
investments. Through Grupo Torras, the Kuwait Investment Authority invested heavily in
multiple large and ostentatious projects based in Spain, including the Gate of Europe
towers in Madrid. 22
In 1993, the KIO filed a lawsuit claiming that “through the use of various shell
companies, fictitious loans, fraud and embezzlement, the former Torras management
conspired to steal at least US$500 million between May 1988 and May 1992.” 23 The

21
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targets of this suit were the Sheik Fahad Mohammed al-Sabah, the former chairman of
the KIO and the cousin to the then-Emir of Kuwait; Fouad Khaled Jarrar, the former vice
president of the KIO; and Javier de la Rosa, the Spanish financier who managed Grupo
Torras during the scandal and had previously been known to be unscrupulous with his
investments. 24 This fraud and embezzlement went unnoticed for years due to a
convergence of events: the Spanish boom and bust, negligent monitoring of risky
investments, and attention being focused on the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait during the
Gulf War.
The Kuwait Investment Authority and the KIO blamed the incident almost
entirely on Mr. De la Rosa and the Spanish managers of the Kuwaiti investments, but
Sheik Fahad Mohammed al-Sabah and Fouad Khaled Jaffar were also found guilty of
fraud, with Fouad Khaled Jaffar earning two years in prison. 25 Mr. De la Rosa, who was
also sentenced to fifteen years in prison, did claim, however, that the implication of these
two members of the royal family was magnified as a way for figures in Kuwait to harass
the ruling al Sabah family. This incident demonstrated the potential for fraudulent
activity and serious embezzlement of funds, particularly when members of the royal
family are involved in managing the funds rather than overseeing their hired investment
managers. It also showed the need for a consistent, long-term investment strategy rather
than investments in risky, short-lived booms, and the need for careful auditing of the
fund’s activities.

24
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Currently the fund is audited regularly by the Board Audit Committee, the State
Audit Bureau, an internal audit, and jointly by two of the “Big Four” auditing firms, as a
way to hedge against the type of fraud seen in the KIO scandal. The leadership of the
Kuwait Investment Authority has also become more insulated from the Kuwaiti
government, with the primary investing office located in London, making the Kuwait
Investment Authority resemble a typical investment management bank much more than a
government agency. This separation is meant to ensure that investments are made based
purely on potential for returns rather than on domestic politics, particularly within the
Future Generations Fund. If this effort to maintain separation is not consistently made,
sovereign wealth funds can easily become a tool for governments and members of royal
families to support their allies, flaunt their wealth, or benefit individuals in power rather
than stabilizing domestic wealth in a way that will benefit their country and its future.
These were clearly concerns when the most recent Kuwait Investment Authority
guidelines were being laid out, and when describing its investment strategy, the Kuwait
Investment Authority reaffirms that it “has based its investment decisions exclusively on
commercial considerations, not on the political or foreign policy interests of the state of
Kuwait.”
Not only does the Kuwait Investment Authority have to monitor its investments to
ensure it achieves its goal of stable domestic growth, but it must also monitor
withdrawals from the fund. As mentioned, removing assets from the General Reserve
Fund requires the passage of an annual budget by the Kuwait National Assembly, which
is meant to ensure some level of liquidity while requiring forethought and due legal
process. The regulations on transferring funds from the Future Generations Fund are even
16

stricter, requiring specific legislation. This type of legislation has only been passed once,
during the Persian Gulf War in 1990. Before the Iraqi invasion, the Future Generations
Fund’s assets were estimated to be about US$100 billion, but by the 1994 it had shrunk to
about US$35 billion. 26 During this conflict, holding assets overseas proved to have
another benefit when then President Bush froze all U.S. held Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets to
ensure that Saddam Hussein would not have access to the billions in Kuwaiti assets held
abroad. 27 This ability to control the foreign reserves even when the Kuwaiti government
was in exile was not only useful to the Kuwaiti government during the conflict, but it
showed foreign investors that Kuwaiti wealth was a reasonably safe investment; even
when under foreign attack, the wealth was kept safe through foreign holdings and
diversification. 28 The regulations of withdrawals of funds are intended to make the
General Reserve Fund and Future Generations Fund more stable government funds than
can be found in most natural resource-rich countries, but this effort would be futile if the
Kuwait National Assembly’s authority were dependent on the support of the ruling alSabah family. Thankfully, Kuwait has “perhaps the most independent parliament in the
Arab World,” and members of the royal family are not allowed to serve in the parliament,
which helps to check the royal family’s control of the funds and keep the fund
management somewhat separated. 29
Unfortunately, restricting the budget is one of the only real powers that the
parliament has; most of its strength comes from being able to curb the al-Sabah family’s

26
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power, but it is limited in its ability to create new legislation. This leads to a stalemate in
which the Emir only proposes limited actions that are beneficial to the royal family and
the parliament displays its power by shutting down those proposals. In return, the Emir is
able to dissolve the parliament, which has become a fairly common action (it has
happened nearly every year in recent years) and requires new elections before the
government can go back to functioning normally. 30
Clearly, there are some serious problems with this system, including incentivizing
parliamentarians to pass extravagant public spending legislation in order to gain support
for the next election, but it is still much more democratic than the authoritarian rule of
some of the other Gulf States. 31 It has some influence in limiting the funds that will be
withdrawn from the Future Generations Fund and General Reserve Fund, but whether it
will be able to function successfully when Kuwait’s economy needs the funds to manage
future volatility is uncertain. Hopefully when the country truly needs to withdraw assets
from these funds to maintain stable economic growth, the royal family and the elected
parliament will be able to unite and make the best decision for Kuwait.
After the 2009 economic crisis, most Gulf States, including the UAE and Qatar,
were quick to withdraw funds from their sovereign wealth funds in order to support the
domestic economy, but withdrawals from the Kuwait Investment Authority were delayed
due to prolonged negotiations, demonstrating the potential problems that overregulation
of the withdrawal of funds can cause. In early 2010, the parliament finally approved a

30
31
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four-year, US$105 billion spending plan to mitigate the negative effects of the global
economic downturn, but this delay was inefficient and costly. 32
The Kuwaiti government is currently considering passing legislation to once again
withdraw assets from the Future Generations Fund, this time to cover the budget deficit
due to low oil prices. If successful, this legislation would liquidate the lowest performing
assets, amounting to US$30 billion of the fund’s current US$600 billion, and this money
would be used to maintain a healthy annual budget and continue large infrastructure
projects being planned. 33
The Kuwaiti government does have to be careful with this type of legislation,
however, and only pass it when necessary. There will certainly be times when injecting
funds into the domestic economy will be beneficial, but if done too often, it could
become a tool to gain support for the Kuwaiti leadership by essentially buying off their
constituents. One domestic spending tool that is extremely common in the oil-exporting
countries of the Middle East is the use of oil subsidies, and Kuwait is no exception. Many
citizens feel that they are entitled to the oil produced by their countries, and subsidizing
the price of energy is one way in which these governments help satisfy this expectation.
These subsidies are a fairly simple way of gaining domestic support, but cutting them
back is not nearly as easy. Nigeria faced weeks of paralyzing protests when President
Goodluck Jonathan tried to cut subsidies in January 2012, and countries in the Middle
East have faced protests when officials have simply hinted at the possibility of trimming
subsidies, despite facing budget deficits which will harm the domestic economy in the
32
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long term. 34 35 The intractability of subsidies make them a suboptimal spending option,
though their tangibility makes them popular. If government officials were given the
freedom to withdraw funds from the Kuwait Investment Authority whenever they
wanted, it is likely that they would increase subsidies even more in order to gain support
and quell public dissatisfaction, despite negative long term effects.
Though Kuwait is one of the richest of the Gulf states and is in no serious
economic danger, having the ability to pull funds from the Future Generations Fund in
times of severe need will mitigate the type of volatility that could lead to instability or a
need to shut down parts of the Kuwaiti economy that are underperforming in today’s
economy but may rebound in the near future. Whether the current legislation is passed
remains to be seen, but if it is, it could further demonstrate to other natural resource-rich
countries the benefit of long-term financial planning in a “rainy day fund,” and the
necessity of having a balanced system that will moderate withdrawals from the state
while being willing to inject funds into the economy when necessary.

Managing Volatility In Crises
Due in large part to the way that the Kuwait Investment Authority was
established, Kuwait has been largely successful in mitigating volatility through various
shocks, including the Iraqi Invasion in the 1990s and oil price fluctuations. It has
historically maintained substantial stores of fairly liquid capital which has been relatively
accessible when the State of Kuwait has most desperately needed it.

34
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Figure 2: Kuwait GDP per capita (1980-2014)
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Source: World Bank National Accounts Data. 2015.

This graph demonstrates that there was a dip from 1990 to 1991 during the Gulf
War, with GDP going from US$18.2 billion to US$10.8 billion GNI per capita, but GDP
moved back up to US$19.9 billion the next year and maintained steady growth. This
rebound was due in large part to the fact that funds from the Kuwait Investment
Authority were withdrawn and injected into the domestic economy, stabilizing
government spending despite domestic turmoil and decreased government revenues.
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Figure 3: Kuwait Government Spending and Revenue (1990-2013)
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Figure 3 displays government spending alongside government revenues starting in
1990. It is clear that the Kuwaiti government was running a deficit during the early 1990s
to pay for defense spending and to maintain some stability during the Iraqi Invasion. By
1996, revenue outpaced expenditure and Kuwait has maintained a growing surplus since.
From 2007 to 2008, there was a slight increase in revenue (US$21.98 billion to
US$23.994 billion), while government spending almost doubled (US$9.8 billion to
US$16 billion).
After the global economy was affected in 2008 by the Great Recession and oil
exporting countries were faced with plummeting oil prices, however, government
revenue dipped more than government spending did (a 24.4 percent drop versus a 13.4
percent drop). This increased spending and subsequent dip shows that, although the
Kuwaiti government may have overextended its spending during the worldwide
economic growth period leading up to 2008, it was able to keep that spending level
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relatively steady even while revenues decreased, primarily due to its consistent
government surpluses and savings mechanisms in the Kuwait Investment Authority.
Figure 4: Kuwait Government Spending and Revenue overlaid with Oil Prices (1990-2013)
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Figure 4 also shows government revenue and expenditure, but overlaid with the
inflation adjusted price of oil. This graph emphasizes the volatility of oil prices over time
and how government revenue follows this pattern fairly closely, though the volatility is
somewhat lessened. Government spending, on the other hand, has maintained a relatively
constant level of growth, with the exception of the 2008 spike. Spending has also grown
at a much lower rate than revenue, showing that the Kuwaiti government has been wary
of over-spending even during periods of economic success.

Conclusion
Overall, the Kuwaiti government has managed its oil wealth wisely over the
years, from being the first to establish a sovereign wealth fund to maintaining high levels
of contributions to this fund over time. Though this conservative strategy has worked
23

well for the country thus far, Kuwait should use its Future Generations Fund to diversify
its domestic economy as well rather than relying on the consistent returns of the General
Reserve Fund to propel the nation through economic downturns. As will be examined,
most other Gulf countries have made concentrated efforts in recent years to grow their
education, banking, trade, and tourism sectors in order to diversify their sources of GDP
away from oil. 36
The International Monetary Fund predicted that Kuwait’s GDP would grow by
1.8 percent in 2015, far below its average of 4.8 percent growth per year from 2000 to
2010 and the Gulf’s average predicted growth of 4.5 percent in 2015. 37 Its significant
capital reserves will prevent the State of Kuwait from any serious deficits in the mediumterm, but avoiding risky investments in its own economy will also prevent the state from
any remarkable growth. In 2010, it announced a five-year development plan that included
US$107 billion of investments in the domestic economy, but nearly every aspect of the
plan was delayed due to disagreements between the government and the parliament. 38
The 2015 World Bank Doing Business Survey ranked Kuwait in the lowest half of all
countries in the categories of “Ease of Doing Business,” “Starting a Business,” and
“Enforcing Contracts.” 39 Unless Kuwait streamlines its business sector and encourages
investment away from the oil and gas sector with the funds in the Future Generations
Fund, it is likely to stagnate and fall behind the progress of the other Gulf States. There is
a fine line between saving to the point that the domestic economy begins to shrink and
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spending too much on domestic investment, but it appears that Kuwait’s wealth
management strategy falls under the first category. Its self-control and consistency is
commendable, but it should focus on encouraging the domestic economy if it is to
achieve long-term economic growth.
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Chapter 2: United Arab Emirates
To fully understand the goals of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and Dubai’s sovereign
wealth funds with respect to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), one must first understand
the way that the UAE is organized both financially and politically. The UAE is composed
of seven different monarchical emirates, united in 1971 under a constitution that
established the Federal Supreme Council, comprised of the rulers of the seven emirates.
The Federal Supreme Council is given jurisdiction over foreign affairs, citizenship issues,
education, public health, and other public services, but many other powers, including
management of natural resources and wealth of the emirate, are left under the jurisdiction
of the individual emirates. 40 Within the Federal Supreme Council, Abu Dhabi and Dubai
have veto power over any new jurisdiction, and the leader of Abu Dhabi has traditionally
served as leader of the Council though elections are held every five years. 41 Although
institutions have been established to manage the legislative, executive, and judicial
activities of the government, Abu Dhabi controls much of the Council’s activity, due to
its size, control over the oil wealth, and management of the majority of the sovereign
wealth funds. Despite being only one of seven emirates, Abu Dhabi controls the majority
of government operations and over 90 percent of the oil revenue, while the other
emirates, namely Dubai, have more diversified sources of income based on tourism,
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trade, and service industries. 42 For this reason, this chapter will focus primarily on Abu
Dhabi’s strategies to manage oil wealth. 43
Figure 5: UAE Government Spending and Revenue on Oil Prices
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As seen in Figure 5, the UAE’s government revenues have been highly correlated
with oil prices historically, falling and rising at the same time from 1990-2010. They both
fell dramatically in 2009 as a result of the global economic crisis, but after this point, the
two lines intersect and revenue growth begins to outpace oil price growth. Though this
turning point is rather recent, it does represent the significant strides that the UAE has
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Abu Dhabi’s other sovereign wealth funds include the Abu Dhabi National Energy
Company, the Abu Dhabi Investment Company, and the International Petroleum
Investment Company, but these organizations are focused almost exclusively in
reinvesting their oil wealth into further development of the oil and gas industry, so their
activities are not relevant to oil wealth diversification. Similarly, the Emirates Investment
Authority and the Investment Corporation of Dubai serve as active managers of their
governments’ investments rather than diversification funds, so they are also excluded
from this analysis.
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made towards becoming more oil revenue independent in recent years, particularly after
the formation of the Mubadala sovereign wealth fund.

The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
As previously mentioned, a key component of a sovereign wealth fund’s success
in managing oil wealth in a way that best serves the long-term growth of the nation is its
transparency. Following the Santiago Principles by publishing frequent reports that show
the fund is following a sound legal system not only serves to reduce corruption, but it
encourages other foreign investors’ trust in the country’s stability and trustworthiness,
which in turn leads to higher foreign investment and overall growth. 44 Unfortunately,
Abu Dhabi is not very transparent in its wealth management activities. The Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority (ADIA) has never published an annual report, and very little
information regarding its investments, inflows, or outflows is available. Even its size is
unknown, and estimates vary from US$600 billion to US$900 billion. 45 The Abu Dhabi
Investment Council also owns a number of other sovereign wealth funds: Mubadala
(estimated US$60 billion in assets), the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (US 9
billion), the Abu Dhabi Investment Company (US$7 billion), and the International
Petroleum Investment Company (US$6.5 billion), most of which have separate
subsidiaries or foreign investment branches. 46 Combined, this makes Abu Dhabi’s oil
wealth extremely difficult to track, and the idea that significant funds are slipping through
the cracks and into particular individuals’ private bank accounts is not a far-fetched one.
44
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Some attempts have been made, at least domestically, to give the appearance of
transparency. In 1985, the Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority was formed “as an
independent body reporting to His Highness the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi” to oversee
public spending and ensure that the Emirate’s funds are managed legitimately. Along
with auditing government sectors and investigating corruption, it claims to ensure that
“public resources and funds are managed, collected, and expended efficiently, effectively,
and economically,” which includes auditing the activities of Abu Dhabi’s sovereign
wealth funds. 47 A key flaw in this accountability system is that most of the reports
produced by the Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority go directly to the Crown Prince,
and are not released to the public, with the exception of selected excerpts. As a result, the
organizations being audited are not held to worldwide best-practice standards or are
accountable to the citizens of Abu Dhabi. As a result, any corruption that would hurt the
Emirate from the perspective of the Crown Prince will likely be minimized, but if the
Crown Prince does not see an issue as being particularly important, the world may never
know about serious scandals or misconduct. Not only does this reduce the accountability
of the royal family to its citizens, but it makes it extremely difficult to measure how well
Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth funds’ money is spent and whether it is effective
With between US$ 600 and US$ 900 billion in estimated assets under
management, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) is the world’s second largest
sovereign wealth fund, after Norway’s Government Pension Fund, and whether its funds
are invested properly and with good intentions is important to both the UAE and the
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global economy. 48 The ADIA was founded in 1976, soon after the UAE gained
independence, with a mission to “sustain the long-term prosperity of Abu Dhabi by
prudently growing capital through a disciplined investment process and committed
people who reflect ADIA’s cultural values.” 49 According to its website, the Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority “has no visibility on either the spending requirements of the
Government of Abu Dhabi or the activities of other Abu Dhabi entities established by the
Government to make investments.” 50 This does not seem realistic since the Chairman of
the Board of Directors is Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, the ruler of the emirate of
Abu Dhabi and the president of the UAE. 51 The Vice Chairman, Managing Director, and
three other members of the ten member board are also members of the Al-Nahyan family
and close relatives of Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. 52
There is no set percentage of the government revenue that is to be set aside in the
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, as is specified for the Kuwait Investment Authority,
but the UAE Constitution does specify that the Emirate’s government is to provide the
ADIA with funds that are surplus to its budgetary requirements and other funding
commitments. If the government is not required to allot a certain amount to the fund each
year, there is no incentive for it to give to the fund; if the allotment is based solely on a
government surplus, the government may have a perverse incentive to spend on
unnecessary or frivolous projects rather than putting the money away. On the other side,
the ADIA “is required to make available to the Government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi,
48
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as needed, the financial resources to secure and maintain the future welfare of the
Emirate.” Both of these are vague regulations, which leave the fund vulnerable to
manipulation by the state. When the government holds this power to take from the fund
whenever necessary, the fund can lose its effectiveness as a stabilization tool.

Mubadala
Formed in 2002 with the mandate to “strengthen Abu Dhabi’s growth potential,
and to help the government meet its socioeconomic targets”, Mubadala is Abu Dhabi’s
second largest sovereign wealth fund. 53 Rather than taking a hands-off investment
approach by avoiding owning significant parts of any specific company, as most other
sovereign wealth funds tend to do, Mubadala takes an active investment approach and
attempts to guide the management of the companies with which it partners. While
Mubadala does invest its US$60 billion in assets under management globally, it is largely
focused on investing within the UAE, supporting infant industries and promoting growth
within the country. For example, in 2013 Mubadala worked with Dubai Aluminum and
Emirates Aluminum to create Emirates Global Aluminum, which was the largest
industrial merger in the history of the UAE. Rather than serving as a savings fund,
collecting steady returns for use by future generations, Mubadala is much more focused
on delivering “strong social returns to Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates.” 54
One of Mubadala’s biggest investment projects to date is Masdar City, a planned
city eleven miles east of the city of Abu Dhabi designed in collaboration with a British
architecture firm and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and meant to rely
53
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entirely on solar energy and renewable energy sources. This project is estimated to cost
between $18 and $22 billion. 55 Two years after its initiation in 2006, the global financial
crisis postponed the project’s completion by up to ten years, and the current low oil prices
are threatening to further affect the project. The first operational organization in the new
city was the Masdar Institute of Science and Technology, and the city is planned to be a
hub of scientific advancement, focused primarily on renewable energy and sustainability,
with current projects researching desalination techniques, waste management, and
sustainable agriculture. 56 While this project does have potential for extremely high
returns, both financially and scientifically, it is quite risky. Masdar City could provide
critical solutions to climate change, but it could also turn into an unremarkable
experiment which essentially wastes US$ 20 billion of the UAE’s wealth.
Though Masdar City is Mubadala’s biggest project to date, it is not the only
extravagant project started in the UAE in recent years. While the country can afford these
demonstrations of wealth right now, and they may bring in significant tourism and
foreign investment income, they are not the types of investments that have a high
probability of creating steady returns through future economic downturns.

Conclusion
In recent years, the UAE’s inflation adjusted GDP has grown at an estimated rate
of 3.6 percent, while non-oil sector growth has been growing at a rate closer to 5
percent. 57 Figure 6 displays total GDP from 1980-2013 as a function of its different
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industries, with value added from the oil and gas industry included in “Industry” and
retail, transport, professional services, personal services, trade, etc. categorized as
“Service.” While “Industry” has grown over the years at a compounded annual growth
rate of 6.4 percent over the 33 years displayed, “Service” has outpaced it at 8.4 percent.
Figure 6: UAE Total GDP by Sector 58
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Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund strategy is much more focused on
diversification through domestic development than other Gulf countries which tend to
prioritize long term diversification away from oil dependency through investment in
foreign assets. To diversify within the UAE’s economy, Abu Dhabi has focused on
expanding its healthcare, biotechnology, financial services, telecommunication services,
and tourism sectors to make itself more attractive to foreign investment and the
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international business community. 59 As oil reserves are depleted and oil prices become
more volatile due to high market supply or instability in the Middle East, this
diversification of income within UAE may serve to take the UAE away from oil
dependency. However, these extravagant investments do represent high levels of risk and
if the funds are not adequately managed, they may do more harm than good.
The UAE has a very small population and the 21st highest GDP per capita in the
world as of 2014, so it has significantly more tolerance for wealth mismanagement by the
government than a poorer country, but it should be cautious with how funds are
transferred to and from the government and the sovereign wealth funds (ideally
structuring these regulations in accordance with the Santiago Principles) if it is to
maximize its future growth.
The United Arab Emirates has also never had to withstand the direct impact of a
significant regional conflict, as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have, which means that
emergency withdrawals have never been needed. To some extent, the UAE will be able
to grow and withstand oil price and supply shocks based on its domestic diversification,
but investing in the domestic economy diminishes the diversification purpose of
sovereign wealth funds to some extent. On the one hand, this strategy does diversify
income sources away from dependency on oil revenues, but it does not reduce
dependency on a strong domestic economic position. One can only hope that in difficult
times such as the current oil plunge that the sectors the UAE has invested in over the
recent years will continue to show strong growth.
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Chapter 3: Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia produces an estimated 9,735,000 barrels of oil per day, making it the
second largest oil producer in the world and the leader in total exports. 60 Historically, it
has accounted for nearly 40 percent of total Middle East oil production (see Figure 7),
and nearly 60 percent of its own GDP comes from oil revenues. 61 Saudi Arabia’s oil
reserves were first discovered in 1938, and the state-owned Arabian American Oil
Company (ARAMCO, now Saudi Aramco) was formed soon after. 62 In 1952, the central
bank now known as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was formed in a joint
effort by Saudi Arabia and the United States as a way to manage the Kingdom’s oil
revenues and to introduce some stability to the Kingdom’s economic system. 63
Figure 7: Total Middle East Oil Production (in billions of barrels per day)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Rest of Middle East
Saudi Arabia

Source: The U.S. Energy Information Administration

60

The World Factbook 2016a.
The World Factbook 2016b.
61
The World Bank 2016 a.
U.S. Energy Information Administration 2016a.
62
Saudi Aramco 2016.
63
SAMA 2016.
35

Though the formation of this agency was difficult, as banks and other interestcharging institutions are forbidden by Saudi Arabia’s strict Islamic code, SAMA now has
an estimated US$632 billion in assets under management and is in charge of issuing
currency, developing the banking system, and managing the country’s assets both within
Saudi Arabia and through foreign investments. 64 Unlike other major oil exporters, Saudi
Arabia does not have a separate sovereign wealth fund to manage its oil wealth; instead
SAMA acts as both the central bank and the oil wealth manager, investing in foreign
assets through SAMA Foreign Holdings.
Figure 8: Saudi Arabia’s Net Government Surplus 1992-2014 (in US Billions)
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Although the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute includes SAMA in its list of sovereign
wealth funds, it is not officially declared to be one, and it has not received the
contributions from the government in the way that sovereign wealth funds typically do.
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Domestic Development
Saudi Arabia has managed to consistently run spending deficits, and therefore has
not had the same level of government surplus as most other oil producing Gulf countries
(see Figure 8), meaning that the country is able to contribute significantly less to the fund
than most other oil producers in the Gulf.
Figure 9: Saudi Arabia Government Revenue against Expenditure (in US Billions)
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These deficits have generally not been due to low government revenues, but
rather to Saudi Arabia’s extremely high levels of government spending, as seen in Figure
9. Most of this high level of spending has gone towards the categories of “Defense &
Security,” and “Human Resource Development.”
Defense and Security spending has consistently accounted for between 30 and 40
percent of government expenditure, placing Saudi Arabia third in total military spending
worldwide, behind the United States and China, and surpassing many larger countries
with much higher levels of gross national product. 65 This spending is important for Saudi
Arabia to maintain its position as a military power in an extremely unstable area,
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surrounded by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Iran, and other threats to national
security; but spending at this level is also a primary reason for the consistent deficits that
Saudi Arabia has faced, as displayed in Figure 3.
Figure 10: Government Spending by Category 1992-2014 (in US Billions)
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The “Human Resource Development” category also makes up a large portion of
the budget, with most of these funds going into the Human Resource Development Fund.
The mandate of this fund is to generally increase employment within Saudi Arabia by
offering grants, investing in education and training opportunities, providing financial
assistance to students, and conduct research in order to better prepare the Saudi
workforce and thereby increase Saudi Arabia’s human capital. 66 The growth in this
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section of the budget allocation demonstrates a strong commitment by Saudi Arabia to
developing its workforce and is the largest attempt at diversifying its human capital value
away from the oil and gas sector, but the lack of clear policy objectives or tangible
measurements of success makes it difficult to gauge whether these efforts have in fact
been successful.
According to a 2013 International Monetary Fund report, the total unemployment
rate has remained around 5.8 percent among all residents in recent years, but
unemployment among Saudis alone has risen to 12.1 percent, with unemployment for
women and youths at even higher rates. 67 This is attributed to the fact that the sectors that
have grown the most in recent years are generally dependent on low-skilled foreign
workers, and that, while more women are entering the labor force due to decreasing
fertility rates, there is still very poor gender equality in Saudi Arabia, particularly in the
labor force. In order for the Human Resource Development Fund to truly grow domestic
employment, it should focus on ensuring that women, who make up fifty percent of the
country’s population, are not left unemployed and underutilized while unskilled foreign
workers find ready employment.
While there have clearly been some efforts at domestic development through
growing Saudi Arabia’s skilled labor force, the capital used for these investments have
either come directly from the government budget or through Saudi Aramco itself rather
than through a domestic development fund like Kuwait’s General Reserve Fund, Abu
Dhabi’s Mubadala, or Oman’s Investment Fund. This lack of an external savings fund
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has reduced stability in the kingdom throughout its history. During the 1970s, when oil
prices skyrocketed and Saudi Arabia’s yearly government revenue increased from
US$1.7 billion in 1970 to US$70 billion in 1980, spending rose at almost exactly the
same pace, demonstrating a lack of fiscal responsibility (see Figure 11). During this
windfall of oil revenues, most other Gulf nations’ Kuwait and the UAE’s government
revenue increased much more than their expenditure, and this excess was placed in
savings funds which then either gained interest or were used to fund defense spending
during the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand,
experienced a deficit during the Gulf War and was forced to sell most of its foreign
assets. 68 Despite this period of financial difficulty, Saudi Arabia has continued either to
spend its oil wealth on its domestic energy sector or to retain much of its wealth in Saudi
Aramco which invests it further in Saudi Arabia’s oil and gas sector.
Figure 11: Saudi Arabia Budget Data 1961-1981 (in million riyals)
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Attracting Foreign Investment
In 2015, Saudi Arabia issued its first bonds in the country’s history, amounting to
15 billion riyals (about US$ 4 billion), and opened the Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange,
hopeful that these two developments would encourage foreign investment. 69 Previously,
individuals or firms that were not citizens of a Gulf country had to register with the Saudi
Arabian General Investment Authority in order to invest within Saudi Arabia, which
deterred significant investments from non-Gulf countries. 70 Furthermore, companies in
Saudi Arabia are subject to Sharia law, which restricts their business practices and the
types of investments they can accept, particularly regarding interest collection. 71
Encouraging companies to list themselves in this new market also encourages them to
publish official annual reports and submit themselves to audits, which would increase the
transparency that is often lacking in the Saudi Arabian business sector. In fact, Saudi
Arabia earned a score of 52/100 in public sector transparency from Transparency
International and GAN Integrity Solutions claims that “Companies operating or planning
to invest in Saudi Arabia face a high risk of corruption. Abuse of power, nepotism, and
the use of middlemen to do business are particularly common.” 72
Additionally, much of the oil wealth goes to the royal family and their supporters;
in 1988, “Prince al-Waleed bin Tala bin Abdelaziz said in an interview that princes on
average were getting US$150,000 per year. At the time, and assuming a Saudi royal
family of about 15,000, this amounted to about 7 percent of the gross oil revenues after
69
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production cost.” 73 These rankings and excerpts do not encourage foreign investment in
the Saudi Arabian economy.
Saudi Aramco is itself one of the world’s largest companies, if not the largest,
valued at well over a trillion US dollars. 74 For comparison, Apple Inc. is valued at an
estimated US$600 billion. 75 In order to further attract foreign investment in the current
oil price downturn, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in an interview on
April 1, 2016 that the Public Investment Fund, an offshoot of Sanabil Investments, would
grow exponentially in the near future, eventually managing US$2 trillion dollars. 76
Previously, the Public Investment Fund’s sole mandate was to hold equity positions in
domestic companies, essentially offering loans to prop up Saudi Arabian industries. 77 The
Deputy Crown Prince also revealed that the Public Investment Fund would grow from its
current value of almost US$5 US billion to US$2 trillion by selling shares in Saudi
Aramco. 78 This will “technically make investments the source of Saudi government
revenue, not oil… What is left now is to diversify investments so within 20 years, we will
be an economy or state that doesn’t depend mainly on oil.”
While this does sound like a decent plan initially and it may encourage foreign
investment, it does not actually diversify the economy away from oil. It just gives a tiny
percentage of the ownership of the oil firm to foreign investors, but the funds are still
coming from the value that oil exports bring to the economy. The second part of the
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quote seems like a more promising way to diversify the economy away from oil, but
whether this stock sale will actually earn enough revenue that Saudi Arabia will be able
to make significant returns from further investing abroad is up for debate. 79 Where Saudi
Arabia’s significant foreign investments would go is another crucial question that must be
answered. In response to investments by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority in
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and Dubai Ports World in 2006 and 2007, the U.S. enacted the
Foreign Investment and National Security Act, requiring the U.S. government to
seriously evaluate investments and mergers with and by foreign firms, particularly
sovereign wealth funds, and other countries have also become more wary of large
investments by sovereign wealth funds. 80 Investments by a US$2 trillion Saudi-based
investment fund are bound to attract scrutiny under this Act. This fear of takeover by
Gulf States is not specific to the United States, and may also cause problems if Saudi
Arabia’s Public Investment Fund tries to invest massive amounts of capital in other
western firms, particularly if it tries to buy controlling shares in large companies.
The Deputy Crown Prince’s plan may also be flawed in his estimates of how
much investment Saudi Aramco’s Initial Public Offering will attract. It is estimated that
Saudi Arabia’s fiscal breakeven oil price (the oil price required for the country to balance
its current budget) is around US$100 per barrel of crude oil. 81 The price per barrel of oil
was at just over US$35 on April 1, 2016, so the probability that Saudi Aramco is going to
see significant financial success in this fiscal year is impossibly small. Most companies
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wait until they are experiencing high levels of success before filing an initial public
offering because investors are much more likely to invest in a company that is doing well,
so the timing of this announcement shows that Saudi Arabia is desperate for an influx of
foreign capital, not that it is considering making Aramco public because it is the best
financial move.
Another concerning problem that this initial public offering will face is that that
the company is “still a quasi-ministry,” and that listing even a small amount of the
company publicly will dilute the government’s ownership in its most valuable asset. 82
Whether it will be willing to give up this power and whether foreign investors will be
willing to invest in a company so heavily controlled by the Saudi Arabian government are
both very important questions that could seriously alter the outcome of the Deputy Crown
Prince’s plan.

Conclusion
While some efforts to promote a more diversified economy are being made,
particularly by the Human Resource Development Fund, Saudi Arabia is still severely
dependent on oil revenues, leaving it extremely vulnerable to oil price downturns like the
current one, which is receding slowly, if at all. 83 As mentioned, 60 percent of its GDP
comes from oil revenues, which leaves the country vulnerable to price fluctuations,
especially when it raises its expenditure on defense and domestic spending whenever
revenues rise and leaves very little savings for future downturns. As Bloomberg’s Liam
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Denning put it, “A good rule of thumb when it comes to public announcements of reform
from opaque autocracies is that opaque autocracies generally only do this when they
really have to. Saudi Arabia has more money stashed away from the oil boom than many
of its peers; but, since peaking in August 2014, its foreign-exchange reserves have
dropped by more than a fifth.” 84 Saudi Arabia’s plan to put shares of Saudi Aramco on a
public market, even when oil prices are as low as they have been in the past year, is a
bold one, and it shows that the government is desperate for diversification and a more
steady stream of income. While this strategy may provide an influx of foreign capital in
the near future, Saudi Arabia needs a more permanent evolution of its economy from
being completely oil dependent and spending beyond its means to one seeking stability
and long term growth for future generations. In order to move towards that more
sustainable model, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should commit to lowering spending
wherever possible and committing a significant and consistent portion of its revenues to
SAMA or a new sovereign wealth fund which will then invest in low-risk foreign
investments and diversification of the domestic Saudi Arabian economy.
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Chapter 4: Bahrain
Although the Kingdom of Bahrain accounts for less than 1 percent of total oil produced
in the Middle East, it was the first country in the region to discover oil, and its economy
has always been based on revenues from this natural resource. 85 Despite its initial oil
dependence, it has become the least oil dependent country in the Gulf region, with oil
revenues making up only 19 percent of GDP in 2012. This diversification away from oil
has happened fairly recently; in 2000, the oil and gas sector was responsible for 44
percent of real GDP. Unfortunately, the government budget has not moved away from oil
dependency at the same rate, as oil and gas earnings still make up around 90 percent of
annual government revenue. 86 Moving away from oil dependence is crucial to the
country’s sustained success, both economically and politically.
Figure 12: Oil and Non-Oil Revenues as a share of Bahraini GDP (1980-1995)
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Geopolitical Aspects of Oil Revenues
Bahrain currently collects revenues from oil originating in two oil fields: the
onshore Bahrain Field and the much larger offshore Abu Sa’afa Field, between Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia and shared by the two countries. The Bahrain Field has produced about
70,000 barrels per day in recent years, but the majority of production comes from the
Abu Sa’afa Field, which has produced about 120,000 barrels per day for Bahrain and
about 150,000 barrels per day for Saudi Arabia in recent years. This is supposed to be
more equally split, but Bahrain’s share of the field has been under maintenance in recent
years and has therefore been producing less. This arrangement has been in place since
1996, though before 1958 the field belonged entirely to Bahrain. 87 At that time, Bahrain
was ruled by Britain and could only manage its oil fields through the resident British
representative, which made it difficult for Bahrain to effectively produce and refine the
oil, so Bahrain relinquished control of the field to Saudi but retains half of the oil
revenue. 88
Since then, Saudi Arabia’s Aramco has fully managed production and has
controlled the amount of revenue Bahrain receives, with this amount fluctuating
depending on the success of Saudi’s own oil fields and oil prices. This makes Bahrain’s
largest single source of income vulnerable to the whims of its much larger neighbor.
Saudi Arabia has been fairly generous in sharing these profits, not purely out of
benevolence but also as a way to support the Sunni leadership in Bahrain while
maintaining the bilateral alliance between the countries. While this relationship has
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historically remained positive and keeping it so is strategically advantageous to both
countries at the moment, it does leave Bahrain vulnerable to Saudi Arabia.
The proprietary right to the revenues of the Abu Sa’afa Fields is not the only way
that Bahrain’s oil and gas wealth is vulnerable to the region’s political conflicts, and
diversifying revenues away from dependence on this field has also proven extremely
difficult because of this geopolitical instability in the Gulf. Bahrain has tried to expand its
oil and gas sectors away from the Abu Sa’afa fields through exploring its own natural gas
resources (which would require considerable infrastructure investments), considering
purchasing Qatari gas (an idea which was discouraged by Saudi Arabia and subsequently
dropped), and even by entering import negotiations with Iran. 89 Though Bahrain’s
refining capabilities far exceed its production capacity, Iran has the opposite problem,
making this seem like a perfect economic match, this option has been put on hold
multiple times due to diplomatic conflicts. 90
Bahrain’s population is about 70 percent Shia, but the ruling al Khalifa family is
Sunni, corresponding to economic disparity between the ruling Sunni elite and the much
less wealthy Shia population. 91 Saudi Arabia is also a Sunni power and supports the
continued rule of the al Khalifa family, but Iran, a the major Shia power in the region,
does not support the Sunni elite and has been accused of “stoking political protests,” and
even being involved in the Bahraini uprisings of 2011 in the midst of the Arab Spring. 92
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This period of instability was primarily due to institutionalized discrimination
towards the Shia population in Bahrain, particularly in the political realm, though
hostility regarding the sectarian differences between Shia and Sunni populations had
generally been muffled by the country’s economic success in the past. As uprisings
spread through the Middle East in 2011, Bahrain’s problems surfaced as well, and the fire
was stoked by Saudi Arabia and Iran’s competition for power that has fueled instability
for decades. 93 On March 14, 2011, one month after protests began, the Kingdom of
Bahrain sought the help of Saudi Arabian forces through a Gulf Cooperation Council
security clause signed into the 1982 GCC Internal Security Agreement.
Since the height of the uprisings, Bahrain has regained some stability, though no
real changes were made in the way that the country is governed, and there are still
periodic incidents of violence. 94 This pent up dissatisfaction has the potential to cause
serious damage to Bahrain in the future, and being caught between Saudi Arabia and Iran
in a proxy battle for power is only going to aggravate the problem. 95 In 2011, just before
the protests broke out, talks between Bahrain and Iran regarding a pipeline were making
progress, but “The project to import Iranian gas (was) halted because of the blatant
Iranian interference,” and this project is unlikely to make any progress due to the
geopolitical complexity of the region. 96 This problem, along with the complications that
come with dependency on Saudi Arabia for revenues from Abu Sa’afa, emphasize
Bahrain’s need for diversification away from oil dependency.
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Economic Diversification
In the 1970s, Bahrain established its reputation as a major offshore banking center
for the oil rich Gulf nations, and the tiny island is now home to more than 400 financial
institutions. 97 Though its prominence as the banking center of the Middle East is being
threatened by growth of the banking industries in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Doha, and Riyadh,
the sector is still widely respected, particularly in the fields of Islamic finance, asset
management, and insurance. 98 To “satisfy the training and development needs of the local
banking sector,” the Bahrain Institute of Banking and Finance was formed in 1981 and it
now educates over 16,000 students a year. 99
With its central location and with the absence of corporation taxes, personal
income taxes, wealth taxes on capital gains, and no restrictions on repatriation of capital,
profits, or dividends, Bahrain has made itself extremely appealing to foreign firms and
individuals looking for a tax haven. 100 While these lenient tax policies have helped attract
businesses to the island state and grow total GDP, they have hurt government revenues,
which are still highly dependent on oil revenues (see Figure 13), and fall far short of
covering the government’s expenditures. Bahrain’s current level of debt is estimated to
be around 6 billion Bahraini dinars (US$15.9 billion), and expenditure on “government
debt interest” is set to reach 390 million Bahraini dinars (US$1 billion) in 2016.
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Figure 13: 2015 Bahrain Government Revenue and Expenditure

2015
Net Oil & Gas Revenue

4,507,085,550

Non-Oil Revenue

976,106,300

Grants

74,730,000

Total Revenue

5,557,921,850

Total Expenditure

9,544,202,900

Surplus/(Deficit)

(3,986,281,050)

Source: Bahrain Institute of Banking and Finance 2016.

This debt needs to be restrained, and the way for Bahrain to do so, according to an
IMF report, is to “adopt a gradual retargeting of subsidies, contain public-sector wage
increases, increase non-oil revenues, rationalize capital expenditures, and place the
pension fund on a sustainable path.” 101 In 2015, subsidies for food, housing, retirement
programs, the Social Welfare Fund, and the National Social Fund accounted for over US$
400 million, over ten percent of total government expenditure. Reducing these subsidies
will prove challenging, especially with a population that already feels as if the elite has
systematically oppressed them by collecting all the oil wealth without letting the masses
benefit. Bahrain is moving forward with subsidy cuts though, particularly its subsidies on
red meat and energy. 102 To minimize backlash for the meat subsidy cuts, it has
established compensation funds, for which over 116,000 families have already signed
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up. 103 Though this compensation program will lower the positive effect of cutting
subsidies, only permanent residents of Bahrain will be eligible for compensation. 104
Cutting energy subsidies have further caused a 60 percent rise in Bahraini gas prices,
angering residents and several members of Parliament who declared “the decision will
make the poor poorer. We demand an improvement to people’s standard of living, and
what the government did yesterday will not achieve that.” 105 Further subsidy cuts on
water and electricity are scheduled to take place within the next year, though further
protests could postpone those cuts. 106

Mumtalakat Holding Company
Institutionally, the Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company and the Bahrain Future
Generations Reserve Fund were founded in 2006 to manage Bahraini funds. 107
Mumtalakat currently manages an estimated US $11.1 billion which is invested in non-oil
and gas sector assets within Bahrain. 108 This fund is ranked a ten out of ten in
transparency by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute’ Linaburg-Maduell Index and is
independently audited yearly, but it was ranked 28 out of 100 on “Compliance with the
Santiago Principles” in a 2011 Report published by the Peterson Institute for International
Economics and 24 out of 100 on the same metric by a 2013 report published by
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GeoEconomica. 109 These rankings place Bahrain in the bottom two of twenty funds
studied, but offer no explanation for these rankings. The metrics used to measure the
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute’s Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index are similar to
those used to rank Santiago Compliance, with some differences that may explain this
discrepancy. The Linaburg-Maduell Index focuses on the availability of independently
audited annual reports, investment strategies, openness regarding the structure of the
firm, and general strategy information. 110 Mumtalakat does publish annual reports with
details about the types and geographical locations of its investments as well as the
structure of the firm, so it does fulfill these qualifications fairly well.
The Santiago Principles, on the other hand, focus on the firm’s internal structure
and how it will be able to maintain the type of investment behavior needed to act as a
proper savings fund. 111 These principles include having a stated long-term objective,
clarifying the terms of adding and withdrawing funds, independence from the governing
body of the state, and a focus on generating high long-term returns on investments,
alongside the transparency criterion in the Linaburg-Maduell Index. The discrepancies
between these ratings can then be at least partially explained by the differences in metrics
– Mumtalakat is extremely transparent in some respects, but its internal organization as a
savings fund with separation from the state, a focus on steady returns, and a consistent
structure by which it manages funding and withdrawals is lacking. There is also a small
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chance that the rankings from 2011 and 2013 are simply outdated and that Mumtalakat
has made enormous strides toward becoming more transparent and Santiago Compliant in
the meantime, but such a large jump in rankings based on time alone is unlikely. More
probable is the idea that Mumtalakat has become slightly more transparent and Santiago
compliant in recent years, but it is still seriously lacking a framework that would make it
close to fully Santiago compliant.

Future Generations Reserve Fund
The Future Generations Reserve Fund was founded with a more clearly outlined
framework for funding and withdrawals. It receives a portion of the state-owned Bahrain
Petroleum Company’s oil revenues through monthly payments and is tasked with
preserving this wealth by investing in liquid securities abroad while dispersing some
capital to the government on an annual basis as needed. 112 Unfortunately, oil and gas
sector revenues have been relatively low since the Future Generations Reserve Fund’s
founding in 2006, and the firm only manages an estimated US $400 million. 113 In 2015,
just over US $50 million was added to the fund, about 1 percent of total oil revenues, but
in 2014 about the same amount was withdrawn to help minimize the government’s
deficit, so the fund has not had a chance to grow in a significant way since its
founding. 114 This fund is meant to imitate Kuwait’s Future Generations Fund, which also
invests internationally in low risk investment vehicles and receives a percentage of oil
and gas sector revenues surpluses yearly, the Kuwait’s fund manages closer to US $600
112
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billion in assets. Bahrain’s Future Generations Reserve Fund has the potential to stabilize
long term growth in Bahrain based on its strong structure and mission statement, but it is
still young and needs significantly more funds if it is to be successful. 115

Conclusion
Further developing these investment funds both to build domestic business sectors
and ensure long-term financial stability will be critical to Bahrain’s future economic
success. The Kingdom of Bahrain is currently threatened by domestic instability, regional
turmoil, overwhelming government debt, and a serious slump in the oil and gas sector. It
has a difficult road ahead, but reducing government spending deficits and managing
surpluses in a more stable, interest-earning way will help it achieve growth and stability.
The Future Generations Fund may be too small of an effort made too late to make a true
impact, but it shows that the Bahraini government is learning from its neighbors that it
needs to save and diversify its wealth wherever possible. The Kingdom of Bahrain must
capitalize on these lessons to create an economy that is less susceptible to geopolitical
turmoil and fluctuating oil prices if it is to create the type of economic growth it needs to
quell domestic dissatisfaction.
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Chapter 5: Qatar
As of 2005, Qatar has been the world’s top exporter of liquefied natural gas
(LNG). 116 While the rest of its Gulf neighbors were exploiting their oil resources during
the oil price boom of the 1970s, Qatar had just begun to discover its natural resource
endowment, and it was not until 1997 that it first exported LNG. 117 To help manage the
sudden influx of LNG wealth, the Qatar Investment Authority was formed in 2005
(though it was unofficially operating as early as 2002) with a mission “to invest, manage,
and grow Qatar’s reserves to create long-term value for the State and future generations”
and “to support the development of a competitive Qatari economy, facilitating economic
diversification and developing local talent.” 118 This sovereign wealth fund is now
managing over US $256 billion making it the fastest growing sovereign wealth fund in
the region. 119 Part of this endowment is also made up of domestic, non-natural resource
related assets which were “assigned to Qatar Investment Authority with the objective of
improving the oversight and coordination.” 120 In this sense, the Qatar Investment
Authority is not only a typical sovereign wealth fund, but also an active manager of some
domestic resources.
Its initial commitment to transparency, or at least the appearance of it, was
demonstrated in 2008 when it played crucial roles in establishing the International Forum
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of Sovereign Wealth Funds and defining the Santiago Principles. 121 However, in a study
of Santiago Principle compliance published by GeoEconomica in 2013, the Qatar
Investment Authority ranked second to last, ahead of Bahrain, in compliance (see Figure
14). 122 Sven Behrendt, GeoEconomica’s managing director, explained this phenomenon
by saying, “Many of the sovereign wealth funds thought that by simply signing the
principles, the international community would believe they would implement them. This
implementation needs to be disclosed so that it can be verified by third parties.” 123
Figure 14: Santiago Compliance Index 2013
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GeoEconomica attributed the lack of compliance to the fact that the Qatar
Investment Authority is relatively new and is one of the most activist firms on the list, but
some of the much older sovereign wealth funds in the area, including the Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority and the Kuwait Investment Authority, are also only rated “partly
compliant,” showing that the funds are not guaranteed to become more transparent or
Santiago Compliant with time. 124 The report closed its discussion on the Qatar
Investment Authority by saying it “could substantially enhance its position as an
established financial market participant if it made a bold move towards embracing and
implementing substantial parts of the Principles.” 125
The Qatar Investment Authority does report to the Supreme Council for
Economic Affairs and Investments, which must approve its strategy and approve the
budget, among other tasks. The Council is made up of the Emir, the Prime Minister, the
Minister of Energy and Industry, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Economy and
Trade, the Governor of the Central Bank, the Economic Adviser to the Emiri Diwan, the
CEO of the Qatar Investment Authority, and a Representative of the Development Bank.
Though this does not fulfill the Santiago Principle definitions of accountability, nor give
Qatari citizens access to information regarding where Qatar’s funds are being invested, it
may minimize corruption from the Supreme Council’s view in the same way that Abu
Dhabi’s Accountability Authority may be able to check the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority’s actions internally.
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Though the procedures have not been made public, apparently clearly defined
steps are required for the funding, investment, and withdrawal strategy of the Qatar
Investment Authority. 126 As mentioned when discussing the Kuwait Authority’s rigorous
withdrawal policies, the regulations surrounding fund withdrawals must strike a balance
between being strict enough to maintain a strong portfolio, and lenient enough so that the
government can withdraw funds when necessary to prop up growth in the domestic
economy, particularly when oil and gas prices fall.

Qatar Investment Authority Activities
Investments are also not publicly disclosed, but the Qatar Investment Authority
states that its approach is “based on prudent risk management,” not subject to
conventional short-term performance measures, with the objective to “achieve a superior
and sustainable rate of return within levels of risk defined by the Supreme Council for
Economic Affairs and Investments.” Exactly what these levels of risk are or what can be
defined as “prudent” is unknown, but these seem to be wise guidelines if they are actually
followed. Some information about the Qatar Investment Authority’s investments have
been made public by the firms in which it is invested, including Volkswagen, Glencore,
the Agricultural Bank of China, Royal Dutch Shell, Siemens, Vinci, and Iberdrola. 127 In
2015, all of these companies had significant losses, and the Financial Times estimated
that the Qatar Investment Authority had lost US$12 billion, US$8.4 billion of which
could have been due to Volkswagen’s downturn after their emissions scandal. 128 This

126

International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds 2016a.
Wright 2015.
128
McLannahan 2015.
127

59

demonstrated the risk of investing significant amounts in private equity rather than more
stable fixed income strategies. However, these firms are not usually regarded to be as
risky as they were in 2015. Forbes criticized the Financial Times’ large loss assumption
by saying that it was impossible to know exactly how much Qatar had invested in these
firms and therefore how much they had lost, but more importantly, funds like the Qatar
Investment Authority are focused on long-term returns, not reacting to each dip and
movement in the market. In the long term, investments in companies like Volkswagen are
predicted to give steady returns, and they should not be overly concerned about
downturns on a quarterly basis.
The Qatar Investment Authority also owns Qatari Diar, a property investment
company that owns the Shard in London and the Olympic Village in London, among
other high profile properties. One of its first projects was Lusail City, a “smart” city very
similar to the Masdar City project in the Abu Dhabi. 129 Again, this project has the
potential to create a new type of sustainable living environment that could reduce climate
change and have tremendous positive effects, but it is also a massive investment with
little guaranteed returns. These investments do not indicate the type of risk-adverse
behavior that would be expected of a savings fund meant to create steady returns for
future generations, but the Qatar Investment Authority may have such a large surplus of
funds that it is not overly concerned with ensuring its investments are safe, making it
more of a state investment fund than a savings fund.
Qatar had also made significant investments in diversifying its domestic economy
before the formation of the Qatar Investment Authority. In 1994, it started the Qatar
129

Real Times 2015.
60

Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development as a way to “lead
human, social, and economic development of Qatar.” 130 Since then, the Qatar Foundation
created Education City, located just outside of Doha, which is now home to multiple
partnerships between Qatar and other institutes and universities, including the RANDQatar Policy Institute, Virginia Commonwealth University, Weill Cornell MedicineQatar, Texas A&M University at Qatar, Carnegie Mellon University Qatar, Georgetown
University of Foreign Service in Qatar, Northwestern University in Qatar, HEC Paris,
and the University College London. These universities have attracted students from
around the world and have brought Qatar closer to achieve the goal set in its “2030
Vision” to “use the vast revenues from its substantial hydrocarbon resources to transform
itself into a modern knowledge-based economy.” 131 Education City is not just an
educational oasis meant to bring international students to Qatar, but it has also benefitted
Qatari students immensely. According to the universities in Education City that have
spoken about the admissions processes, priority is given to qualified Qatari citizens and
about forty percent of students in Education City are Qatari. 132
This project is, however a huge risk, both financially and culturally. To attract
these universities, the Qatari government gives each of them more than US$320 million
each year, showing their dedication to establishing the state’s reputation as a center of
learning and innovation, even when the price tag is extremely high. 133 Qatar is also
known for its strict interpretation of Islam and is the only state, aside from Saudi Arabia,
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that declares Wahhabism as its official religion. 134 Inviting western universities to
educate its people seems like a contradiction to these beliefs, and could threaten the strict
rule that the Emir has on free speech, democracy, and other western values. 135 However,
Education City does have considerable benefits beyond the education of Qatari citizens
and attracting foreign human capital. Both Barak and Michelle Obama have visited
Education City as well as the strategic United States Al Udeid air base, and these symbols
of alliance with the world’s largest military power have helped solidify Qatar’s soft
power in an unstable region, indirectly protecting Qatar’s natural gas resources as well.
Qatar has also gained significant soft power through its ownership of various
media sources, including the Al Jazeera Media Network, based in Doha and partially
funded by the ruling House of Thani. Al Jazeera was founded in 1996 after BBC Arabic
was shut down after Saudi Arabia attempted to censor BBC coverage of executions in
Saudi Arabia. 136 As a way to sustain influence in the media, the Emir of Qatar provided a
loan to Al Jazeera and promoted its growth. The network has now expanded to include Al
Jazeera English, Al Jazeera Balkans, Al Jazeera Sports, AJ+, and other stations which can
be accessed in over 100 countries. 137 Though there have been accusations of the Qatariowned news source as a propaganda machine used by the House of Thani to manipulate
Middle Eastern affairs and Western views of issues in the Arab World, even these
criticisms say that Al Jazeera is “a pernicious, if effective, tool of foreign policy.” 138 The

134

American Foreign Policy Council Almanac 2010.
Anderson, 2015.
136
Al Bab 2016.
137
Al Jazeera 2016.
Hashmi 2011.
138
Fahmy 2015
135

62

network has been the center of a significant amount of controversy, from supporting the
contentious Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the overthrow of President Morsi, to
being accused of being overly sympathetic to Hamas, to being sued a former Al Jazeera
journalist for US$83 million, but it has successfully nonetheless brought western
attention to the tiny state of Qatar, associating it with successful media outreach and more
free speech than other Gulf states. 139 This visibility and connectivity to the rest of the
world is critical to Qatar’s defense strategy, as it allows an area with a population of just
over two million to maintain control over its offshore LNG resources and defend itself
from manipulation from larger and more militarily powerful nations in the Gulf.

Geopolitical Aspects of Oil Revenues
The majority of Qatar’s natural gas resources come from a single offshore area in
the Persian Gulf that is split between Qatar’s North Field and Iran’s South Pars Field (see
Figure 15). 140 The Iranian side has been severely underutilized and, as mentioned in the
previous chapter, Iran would need to make a deal to use Bahrain’s refining facilities if it
were to fully tap its resources in South Pars. 141 This does not seem probable, so South
Pars will likely remain underdeveloped in the near future. If, however, Iran does decide
to further tap the South Pars Field, it may also try to gain access to the North Field, or the
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two countries may engage in a race to extract as much as possible for themselves,
flooding the market and causing LNG prices to fall. 142
Figure 15: South Pars and North Field oil field in the Persian Gulf

Source: Finding Petroleum 2013

Qatar’s military is far too weak to successfully defend the North Field from Iran,
but a strong relationship with the United States may be a strong enough deterrent to stop
Iran from encroaching on Qatari territory. Qatar’s strategy of bringing in western
investment and influence, housing an American Air Base, hosting the 2022 World Cup,
and gaining influence around the world through its media outreach has given the small
state tremendous soft power, which may be a better defense than any military system it
could ever develop.
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Management of Oil Wealth
Since discovering its significant LNG resources, Qatar’s gross national product
has expanded exponentially, and it has managed this influx of wealth wisely for the most
part, though many of its projects have been more focused on image than productivity.
Perhaps because of this delay in natural resource windfalls, Qatar has been much more
prudent with its wealth than its Gulf neighbors. In the past twenty years, GDP has growth
exponentially, with a compounded annual growth rate of 19 percent from 1994 to 2014.
As the Qatar National Vision 2030 put it, “The country’s abundant wealth creates
previously undreamt of opportunities and formidable challenges.” 143 That document
stresses the idea of not only having growth in GDP and economic well-being but also
“modernization and preservation of traditions, the needs of this generation and the needs
of future generations, managed growth and uncontrolled expansion… and economic
growth, social development, and environmental management.” 144
As shown in Figure 16, government revenue growth has remained smooth over
time regardless of oil prices, with the exception of the dip in revenue in 2009 which was
caused primarily by the global economic crisis rather than low oil prices. Government
spending has also grown smoothly over the time period displayed and, though it has
grown, it has maintained a lower growth rate than revenues, demonstrating the
government’s dedication to consistent growth rather than over-spending, even when it has
the means to do so.
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Figure 16: Qatari Government Spending and Expenditure as compared with Oil Prices
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If these trends continue, Qatar looks well prepared to handle fluctuations in oil prices
while maintaining a strong government surplus and placing its excess surplus into its
sovereign wealth funds, creating even higher diversification and government revenues in
the long-term.

Conclusion
In the past twenty years, the State of Qatar has evolved from a tiny state in the
middle of the Persian Gulf with little significance on the global geopolitical scale to one
of the most visible and internationally significant countries in the Middle East. This
transition has been full of contradictions, as evidenced by its strict Muslim values
functioning alongside strong relationship with Western governments and universities as
well as its wealth management strategy – a combination of pioneering western standards
and leaving control to a secretive Emir. Qatar’s government surpluses and third highest
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GDP per capita in the world (at US$96,732 as of 2015) give it the liberty to continue
spending on extravagant projects like the World Cup, Education City, and worldwide
media outlets, but it should be sure to save its revenues wisely while continuing to grow
the Qatar Investment Authority in a way that is conducive to long term growth and
savings, as outlined in the Santiago Principles.
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Chapter 6: Oman
Oil was first discovered in substantial quantities in the Sultanate of Oman in 1964.
Petroleum Development Oman, now 60 percent state-owned, was formed soon after to
manage the extraction and refining of this newly discovered resource. Since then, oil
revenues have made up a significant percentage of total GDP, with 47.2 percent of total
GDP and 85 percent of government revenues coming from the oil and gas sector in
2014. 145 The Sultanate is attempting to diversify away from oil dependency, however,
especially after the steep oil price decline in 2009. Every five years, the Omani
government publishes a Five Year Development Plan that is meant to outline the current
state of the economy, what developments will be made in the next five years both in the
oil sector and in non-oil sectors, and set goals for economic growth. The Eighth Five
Year Development Plan, published in 2010 and meant to serve as a guide for the years
2011-2015, emphasized the need for diversification away from the oil sector and towards
the tourism, industry, agriculture, and fisheries sectors. 146 Its plan to do so involved
strengthening small and medium sized business enterprises, developing the financial
sector, financing the private sector, improving investment climate, and developing
infrastructure. 147 Under this plan, GDP grew at a 3.3 percent annual growth rate, oil
activities grew at a 2.3 percent rate, and non-oil activities grew by 5.8 percent annually.
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The Ninth Five Year Development Plan was recently released and emphasizes
further investment in diversification away from oil, this time led by the manufacturing
and transportation sectors alongside continued growth in the tourism, fisheries, and
mining sectors. It has also stated a goal of “reducing the contribution of oil in GDP at
current prices from 44 percent in the Eighth Plan to 26 percent.” 148 The primary driver of
the planned growth in the manufacturing sector from 9.3 percent to 15 percent of GDP is
the Liwa Plastics Industries Complex, which will “double (Orpic’s) profit, support the
development of a downstream plastics industry in Oman…, create new business
opportunities and employment, and firmly reinforce Orpic as a significant player in the
international petrochemicals marketplace.” 149 Orpic is also known as the “Oman Oil
Refineries & Petroleum Industries Co.,” which is the state-owned oil extraction and
refining business operating in Oman. 150 While the Liwa Complex is projected to benefit
Orpic and therefore government revenues substantially, it is still not entirely oil
independent, as oil is a large component of plastics and particularly polyethylene, which
will make up a large part of the Liwa’s production. Demand for plastic is, however, not
perfectly correlated with worldwide demand for oil and gas products, so this project
should serve to use Oman’s most abundant resource – oil – in a way that is not
completely dependent on oil prices.
The second aspect of the Ninth Development Plan is to invest in transportation
and logistics. 151 Oman’s location in the Gulf, bordered by the Strait of Hormuz and the
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Gulf of Oman, gives it the potential to become a shipping hub for the Middle East and
east and central Africa, but it needs to invest heavily in infrastructure to improve this
sector as much as the Ninth Development Plan claims it will. One of its biggest projects
is to develop Duqm, a small fishing and oil refining town on the coast that had only 5,100
residents in 2008. Since then, the population has tripled and it is planned to increase to
100,000 by 2020 due to the addition of an airport, multiple luxury hotels, a railroad, and a
Special Economic Zone. A four kilometer dry dock has already been built with a US$1.5
billion investment, and, if this “sleeping giant” were to become as successful as the
planners hope, it could “challenge Dubai’s dominance as the region’s trading hub.” 152
According to The Economist, ships travelling from Asia to Europe already stay close to
Oman’s coast on their way to the Suez canal and the availability of a reliable port at
Duqm would be in great demand. 153
There are also plans to build roads, pipelines, and railroads to and from Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with the intention of creating a streamlined oil and
gas shipment system that could bypass the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran periodically
threatens to close. 154 The Oman Rail Project will also connect Duqm with the capital of
Muscat, the port city of Salalah, Sohar near the UAE border, and major mining and oil
fields. This US$13-15 billion project is already underway, with Omani natives
comprising a large portion of the contracted engineers and workers. At least ten percent
of the value for each contract is required to go towards Omani companies, and the project
is expected to grow the Omani economy significantly both by directly employing
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thousands of Omanis and by streamlining supply chain dynamics, making production and
consumption less expensive and more efficient for producers and consumers. 155 Despite
the recent downturn in oil prices, there are no signs that the Oman Rail Project will be
postponed. 156
The third leg of Oman’s Ninth Development Plan is based on building tourism
from two percent of GDP in 2015 to five percent of GDP in 2020. 157 According to the
Plan, there are currently almost 40 tourism-based projects in some stage of development,
and these projects are expected to generate an estimated 100,000 jobs by 2024. These
projects are generally at least partially funded by Oman’s pension investment funds,
which include its sovereign wealth funds. The other sectors planned to expand under the
life of this Plan are the fishing and mining sectors, but there are expected to maintain
only moderate growth, with much less government investment that the first three
sectors. 158

Sovereign Wealth Funds
The Sultanate of Oman currently manages two sovereign wealth funds; the Oman
State General Reserve Fund was founded in 1980 to “achieve long term sustainable
returns on the revenues generated from oil and gas,” and the Oman Investment Fund was
founded in 2006 as an investment vehicle for the Government of Oman with the goal of
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diversifying the Omani economy. 159 The State General Reserve Fund currently manages
an estimated US$34 billion and has acted as a savings fund for future generations, with
steady, low-risk investments supplying consistent revenues. When the fund was formed,
the government of Oman committed 15 per cent of total oil revenues to the fund annually,
but in 1998, due to weak oil prices and low economic growth, this contribution
requirement was changed to be more lenient, with government revenues in excess of
planned budget allocations being set aside in the fund since then. 160 This fund is overseen
and regulated by the Financial Affairs and Energy Resources Council which also sets
Oman’s fiscal policy and manages the state budget. 161 Additionally, the State General
Reserve Fund claims to have a “robust governance framework with clearly defined
policies, process, and procedures,” though this framework is not publicly available.
As with the other oldest sovereign wealth funds in the Gulf (the Kuwait
Investment Authority and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority), the State General
Reserve Fund has historically been discreet with its investments, publishing very little
and maintaining minimal transparency, though the Kuwait Investment Authority and the
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority have made progress towards becoming more
transparent since joining the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and
committing to working towards Santiago Principle Compliance (see Figure 1). 162 On
March 9, 2015, The International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds announced that it
had approved the membership applications of the State General Reserve Fund, which
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requires a commitment to voluntary endorsement of the Santiago Principles and increased
transparency, indicating that Oman’s State General Reserve Fund may become more
open with its information in the near future. 163
Figure 17: Selected SWF Transparency Rankings
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Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 2016b.

The Oman Investment Fund was formed much more recently with an objective to
grow Oman’s economy through diversification away from oil and gas and by investing in
private equity, real estate, infrastructure, and equities both within Oman and abroad. 164
Previously, it was known as the Oman Oil Fund This fund is the vehicle through which
the Government of Oman is funding its infrastructure and tourism as described in the
Ninth Development Plan, but other than these projects very little is known about the size
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or activity of the Oman Investment Fund. Estimates of the fund’s size range from US$6
to 18.2 billion. 165 While this secrecy makes assessing the fund’s effectiveness difficult,
there are actions that could be taken by the fund that could greatly improve the Omani
economy.

Foreign Investment
According to a Capital Markets report on Oman, the country has great difficulty
attracting foreign investment, primarily because so few companies have been made
themselves public by filing initial public offerings in Oman’s stock exchange, the Muscat
Securities Market. 166 This market, formed in 1988, currently only has 116 companies
listed, less than the total number of listings for the Abu Dhabi and Dubai securities
exchanges which were formed in 2000. Capital Markets blames this low public market
participation on Omani CEOs potentially being “loathe to share company financial data,
reticent to pay dividends, or short on the expertise needed,” but no matter what the
reason, Omani companies are not likely to attract the type of investment that could propel
the economy forward while remaining private and closed off to foreign assistance.
Another factor that may prevent foreign investors from investing in Omani companies,
even if they are public, is the Oman Investment Stability Fund, which was formed in
2009 by the Government of Oman as a way to stabilize the price of stocks that may swing
too far up or down. 167 While this may create a semblance of stability within the markets,
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this interference makes the securities even more unpredictable and discourages
investments from outsiders that may be looking for more reliable and calculable
investments. 168

Conclusion
Though its markets need significant improvement before individual companies
can take advantage of foreign investments, Oman has made progress towards becoming
more open to the world economy through trade. In 2009, Oman signed a free trade
agreement with the United States that eliminated most tariff barriers; allowed investors to
fully own businesses in the other country without a local partner; and provided duty-free
access to industrial, agricultural, and consumer products. 169 Though Oman is not
currently in negotiations to form any new bilateral free trade agreements, it is expected
that the Gulf Cooperation Council countries will have free trade agreements with
Singapore, the European Union, India, China, South Kora, Australia, and New Zealand in
the near future, and some of these have already been passed. 170 Oman’s location already
makes it the Gulf’s perfect trading hub, letting shipments bypass both the Strait of
Hormuz and the Gulf of Aden, and the Sultanate has the potential to follow Singapore
and the UAE in using trade as its means to growth, particularly once the Oman Rail
Project and the development of Duqm are completed.
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Though Oman has historically been somewhat dependent on oil revenues, its oil
and gas resources are considered the least accessible in the Gulf, which has forced the
Sultanate to diversify its economy. In recent years, it has made significant progress
towards growing its mining and trade sectors, moving away from oil dependency and
towards being a center of global economic activity. While it is next to impossible to
determine what role Oman’s sovereign wealth funds are having in this transition, it is
clear that the management of the State General Reserve Fund has been focused on longterm growth and saving for the future, while the Oman Investment Fund will promote
domestic growth through more risky, but smaller, investments. As long as these patterns
continue and Oman’s development plans continue as outlined in the Ninth Development
Plan, the Sultanate’s prospects for economic growth despite oil price volatility look
promising.
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Conclusion
An analysis of the growth patterns of countries endowed with rich natural
resources often shows a gloomy picture of mismanagement and foolish spending, leading
to stagnation and lost opportunities for economic development. This has led many
prominent scholars to conclude that there is some type of “natural resource curse” that
prevents nations from capitalizing on these resources, and often even causes them to
“grow more slowly than resource-poor countries.” 171 A deeper look at this so-called curse
shows that it is not a universal phenomenon, and that low or inconsistent growth is
actually related to the very simple problem of placing all of ones eggs in one basket.
This analysis of oil wealth management in the Gulf Cooperation Council
countries has revealed that there are two primary ways by which the nations studied have
attempted to diversify their oil wealth: by investing abroad through savings funds and by
diversifying their domestic economies through strategic development funds. The longer
the savings funds have existed, the larger they are likely to be, and the more revenue they
are likely to accumulate from investments, eventually creating a situation like that of
Kuwait’s wherein returns from its sovereign wealth fund’s investments have contributed
significantly to the government’s revenues and propped up its economy when oil
revenues have been low. When oil prices plummeted in the 1980s, Kuwait earned more
from its foreign investments than from the direct sale of oil, and the Kuwait Investment
Authority’s reserves were critical to maintaining stability during and after the Gulf War.
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On the other side of the spectrum, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have used
their sovereign wealth funds to diversify their domestic economies, creating internal
sources of revenues that are independent from oil exports. This strategy, while slightly
more risky, has created more sustainable and intrinsic growth by building industries
within these countries that are minimally reliant on the success of foreign investments or
oil prices. When Oman discovered its natural gas resources, it was quick to follow their
lead, forming sovereign wealth funds immediately and focusing on building revenue
streams that were not dependent on oil prices. Bahrain, on the other hand, was the first to
discover its oil resources and failed to form sovereign wealth funds until 2006. Saudi
Arabia was also late to form savings and development funds, instead relying on oil
revenues to fund subsidies and its extremely high levels of military spending.
Figure 18 shows the compounded annual growth rates of each of these countries
over the past ten and twenty years, and it is clear that the countries with stable funds have
experienced the most growth, especially if they were focused on domestic development
away from the oil and gas sector.
Figure 18: Compound Annual Growth Rate of GDP
10 Year CAGR
(2004-2014)

20 Year CAGR
(1994-2014)

Qatar

23.37%

19.28%

Oman

13.99%

10.15%

Kuwait

12.53%

10.73%

UAE

11.68%

10.75%

Saudi Arabia

12.62%

9.47%

Bahrain

11.08%

9.15%

Source: IMF Cross Country Macroeconomic Statistics
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One of the fundamental rules of investing is that diversification lowers risk,
maximizing the likelihood of earning higher long-term returns on investments. 172 As seen
in this analysis, diversifying sources of government revenue and GDP is also crucial to
creating steady, long-term growth, particularly when a nation is endowed with a resource
whose price is as volatile as oil. Dependency on inconsistent oil revenues creates
economic instability, which in turn discourages investments in the future economy of a
nation and lowers total growth over time, but moving away from that dependency to a
certain extent is attainable. In order to promote sustainable economic growth, countries
with large natural resource endowments should follow Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait in
forming reliable funds with which they can set aside their resource revenues in stable
foreign investments and develop their own domestic economies.

172

Investopedia 2016.
79

Bibliography
Abed, George T. and Hamid R. Davoodi. “Challenges of Growth and
Globalization in the Middle East and North Africa.” International Monetary Fund. 2003.
Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority. 2015. “Accountability Report.” Abu Dhabi
Accountability Authority. 2015.
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. 2016. “Governance: Relationship with
Government.” Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. Web.
http://www.adia.ae/En/Governance/Abudhabi_Government.aspx (Accessed 6 February
2016)
Al Asoomi, Mohammed. 2012. “Kuwait and economic diversification.” Gulf
News. 28 June 2012. http://gulfnews.com/business/analysis/kuwait-and-economicdiversification-1.1041131 (Accessed 4 February 2016)
Al Bab 2016. “Al Jazeera Television.” Al Bab. Web. http://www.albab.com/media/aljazeera.htm (Accessed 11 April 2016)
Al Husaini, Walid A. 2000. “The Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) scandal : a
study of auditing and audit expectations in an international context.” PhD thesis,
University of Sheffield.
Al Jazeera. 2016. “About Us.” Al Jazeera. Web.
http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/ (Accessed 11 April 2016)
Al Jazeera America 2016.“Bahrain, Oman cut gas subsidies as oil hits 12 year
low.” Al Jazeera America. 12 January 2016. Web.
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/1/12/bahrain-oman-cut-gas-subsidies-as-oilhits-12-year-low.html (Accessed 8 April 2016)
Albawaba. 2002. “Aramco launches Abu Safa oilfield expansion project.”
Albawaba Business. 4 August 2002. Web. http://www.albawaba.com/business/aramcolaunches-abu-safa-oilfield-expansion-project (Accessed 8 April 2016)
Albawaba 2016. “Bahrain’s subsidy reductions bite: gas prices jump 10 percent.”
Albawaba. 13 January 2016. Web. http://www.albawaba.com/business/bahrains-subsidyreductions-bite-gas-prices-jump-60-percent-792646 (Accessed 7 April 2016)
American Foreign Policy Council Almanac. 2010. “Qatar Factsheet.” American
Foreign Policy Council Almanac . June 2010.

80

Anderson, Jared. 2013. “Masdar City: New Urban Energy Future and Climate
Change Solution?” Breaking Energy. 20 March 2013. Web.
http://breakingenergy.com/2013/03/20/masdar-city-new-urban-energy-future-andclimate-change-solution/ (Accessed 15 February 2016)
Anderson, Nick. “In Qatar’s Education City, U.S. colleges are building an
academic oasis.” The Washington Post. 6 December 2015. Web.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-qatars-education-city-us-collegesare-building-an-academic-oasis/2015/12/06/6b538702-8e01-11e5-ae1faf46b7df8483_story.html (Accessed 12 April 2016)
Asrar, Shakeeb. “Education City Student Demographics 2014-2015.” The Daily
Q. 31 January 2015. Web. http://thedailyq.org/2015/01/31/education-city-studentdemographics-2014-15/ (Accessed 22 April 2016)
Baghat, Gawdat. 2011. “Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Gulf: An Assessment.”
London School of Economics and Political Science. Kuwait Programme on
Development, Governance, and Globalisation in the Gulf States. Number 16. July 2011.
Bagnall, Allie and Edwin Truman. 2011. “IFSWF Report on Compliance with the
Santiago Principles: Admirable but Flawed Transparency.” Peterson Institute for
International Economics. Policy Brief Number PB11-14. August 2011.
Bahrain Economic Development Board 2013. “Bahrain Economic Yearbook
2014.” Bahrain Economic Development Board. The Kingdom of Bahrain. 2013.
Bahrain Institute of Banking and Finance. 2016. “BIBF History and Strategy.”
Bahrain Institute of Banking and Finance. Web. http://www.bibf.com/history-strategy/
(Accessed 8 April 2016)
Bahrain Ministry of Finance. 2015. “Budget for the fiscal years 2015-2016 –
Excel.” Ministry of Finance. Kingdom of Bahrain. Last updated 21 September 2015.
Barakat, Marwan S. 2015. “UAE Economic Report.” Group Research
Department. Bank Audi. Lebanaon. 14 January 2015.
Bazoobandi, Sara. 2012. “The Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth
Funds: A case study of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.”
Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Economics. 26 October 2012. Print.
Bilaterals. 2012. “GCC Report.” Bilaterals.org. Last Updated May 2012. Web.
http://www.bilaterals.org/?-GCC- (Accessed 18 2016)
Blas, Javier. 2016. “Too Big to Value: Why Saudi Aramco Is in a League of Its
Own.” Bloomberg. 7 January 2016. Web.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-07/too-big-to-value-why-saudiaramco-is-in-a-league-of-its-own (Accessed 20 February 2016)
Brown, Nathan J. 2001. “Mechanisms of Accountability in Arab Governance:
The Present and Future of Judiciaries and Parliaments in the Arab World.” United
81

Nations Development Program. Programme on Governance in the Arab Region.
December 2001.
Business Anti-Corruption Portal . 2016. “Saudi Arabia Country Profile.” Business
Anti-Corruption Portal. GAN Integrity Solutions. Web. http://www.business-anticorruption.com/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/saudi-arabia/snapshot.aspx
(Accessed 4 April 2016)
Carlisle, Tasmin. 2011. “Iran-Bahrain gas project off again.” The National –
UAE. 23 May 2011. Web. http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/iran-bahrain-gasproject-off-again (Accessed 5 April 2016)
Central Bank of Oman. 2015. “Annual Report 2014.” Central Bank of Oman.
Ruwi. June 2 2015.
Chasany, Anne-Sylvaine. 2014. “QIA leads fund rankings for missing Santiago
governance standards.” Financial Times. 27 October 2014. Web.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b6000716-5b81-11e4-b68a00144feab7de.html#axzz46muhXscm (Accessed 10 April 2016)
Cohen, Roger. “Missing Millions – Kuwait’s Bad Bet—A special report; Big
Wallets and Little Supervision.” The New York Times. 28 September 1993.
Commins, David. “The Gulf States: A Modern History.” I.B. Tauris. 30 March
2012. Web. 16 December 2015.
Critchlow, Andrew. “Iran to trigger natural gas race with Qatar in Persian Gulf.”
The Telegraph. 8 October 2015. Web.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/11920043/AndrewCritchlow-Iran-to-trigger-natural-gas-race-with-Qatar-in-Persian-Gulf.html (Accessed 13
April 2016)
Deloitte 2015. “Bahrain.” Middle East Tax Handbook 2015. Deloitte. 2015. Print.
Denning, Liam. 2016. “Saudi Arabia’s Tesla Roadmap.” Bloomberg Gadfly. 1
April 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-04-01/saudi-aramco-ipoinvestment-fund-bad-news-for-oil
Dickson, Paul. “The Asset Management Review: Fourth Edition.” Law Business
Research Ltd. London. September 2015. Print.
DT News 2015. “Meet Subsidy: Distribution of compensation begins.” DT News
of Bahrain. 2 November 2015. Web.
http://www.newsofbahrain.com/viewNews.php?ppId=7915&TYPE=Posts&pid=21&MN
U=5&SUB= (Accessed 7 April 2016)

82

The Economist. 2013. “Oman’s Mew Port: Sleepy No More.” The Economist. 6
April 2013. Web. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21575819grand-plan-fishing-village-may-luck-transform-country-sleepy-no (Accessed 15 April
2016)
El Baltaji, Dana. “IMF Says Bahrain’s Growing Debt May Be Unsustainable.”
Bloomberg. 16 May 2013. Web. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0516/imf-says-bahrain-s-growing-debt-may-be-unsustainable-by-2018 (Accessed 6 April
2016)
Embassy of the United States in Muscat Oman. 2016. “U.S. – Oman Free Trade
Agreement.” Embassy of the United States in Muscat Oman. Accessed 14 April 2016.
http://oman.usembassy.gov/us-oman-fta.html
Fahmy, Mohamed. “How Qatar Used and Abused its Al Jazeera Journalists.” The
New York Times. 2 June 2015.
Farnsworth, Clyde H. 1990. “ The Iraqi Invation; Bush, in Freezing Assets, Bars
$30 Billion to Hussein.” The New York Times. 3 August 1990.
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/03/world/the-iraqi-invasion-bush-in-freezing-assetsbars-30-billion-to-hussein.html (Accessed 28 January 2016)
Faucon, Benoit. 2016. “Saudi Aramco IPO Could be 5% of Value.” The Wall
Street Journal. 21 April 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-aramco-ipo-could-be-5of-value-1461256171 (Accessed 22 April 2016.
Finding Petroleum. 2013. “Great exploration targets in the Persian Gulf: the North
Dome/South Pars Fields.” 13 February 2013. Web.
http://www.findingpetroleum.com/n/Great_exploration_targets_in_the_Persian_Gulf_the
_North_DomeSouth_Pars_Fields/ab3518c5.aspx (Accessed 12 2016)
General Secretariat for Development Planning. 2008. “Qatar National Vision
2030.”General Secretariat for Development Planning. Doha. July 2008. Print.
GeoEconomica. 2014. “Santiago Compliance Index: Assessing the Governance
Arrangements and Financial Disclosure Policies of Global Sovereign Wealth Funds.”
GeoEconomica GmbH. Geneva. October 2014. Print.
The Government of Abu Dhabi. 2008. “The Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030.”
Department of Planning and Economy. The Government of Abu Dhabi. November 2008.
Print.
The Guardian. 2012. “Nigeria restores fuel subsidy to quell nationwide protests.”
The Guardian. 16 January 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/16/nigeriarestores-fuel-subsidy-protests (Accessed 2 February 2016)

83

Habibi, Nader. 2008. “Managing Oil Wealth: Foreign Assets of GCC Countries.”
Brandeis University. Crown Center for Middle East Studies. Crown Paper 1. June 2008.
Henderson, Simon. “The ‘al-Jazeera Effect.’” The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy: Policywatch 507. 8 December 2000. Web.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-al-jazeera-effect-arabsatellite-television-and-public-opinion (Accessed 12 April 2016)
Hashmi, Muhammad Ali. “Al Jazeera: A Reversal of Perspective.” Kellog-Medill
Northwestern University. MIT Media Lab. 2011. Print.
Hertog. Steffen. “Gulf states are using painful lessons learned in the 1980s to
weather the current crisis.” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 7 July
2009. Web. 18 December 2015.
Human Resource Development Fund . 2016. “Goal.” Human Resource
Development Fund. Web. https://www.hrdf.org.sa/ (Accessed 4 April 2016)
Ibrahim, Ibrahim and Frank Garriga. “Qatar’s Economy: Past, present, and
future.” QScience Connect. Qatar Foundation. 17 September 2012. Print.
IMF. 2013a. “IMF Country Report No. 13/230 - Saudi Arabia: Selected Issues.”
IMF Country Report No. 13/230. International Monetary Fund. Washington D.C. July
2013.
IMF 2013b. “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2013 Article IV Consultation with
Kingdom of Bahrain.” International Monetary Fund. Public Information Notice No.
13/53. 15 May 2013
IMF. 2015. “Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia.”
Washington D.C. International Monetary Fund, 2015.
IMF Cross Country Macroeconomic Statistics. “GDP at Current Prices, USD
Billions.” IMF Cross Country Macroeconomic Statistics Database. Quandl. Web.
https://www.quandl.com/data/ODA/BHR_NGDPD
Institute of International Finance. 2014. “GCC: Strong Diversified Growth,
Limited Risks.” IFF Regional Overview. Institute of International Finance. 4 May 2014.
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 2016a. “Qatar Investment
Authority Introductory Remarks.” International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Web.
http://www.ifswf.org/system/files/MemberNewsAttachment/Qatar%20QIA.pdf
(Accessed 15 April 2016)
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds 2016b. “Press Release: State
General Reserve Fund of Oman and Palestine Investment Fund join IFSWF.”
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Web. http://www.ifswf.org/press84

release/state-general-reserve-fund-oman-and-palestine-investment-fund-join-ifswf
(Accessed 17 April 2016)
The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2016. “The Military Balance
2016.” The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 9 February 2016. Print.
International Institute for Sustainable Development. “A Citizen’s Guide to Energy
Subsidies in Nigeria.” The International Institute for Sustainable Development’s Global
Subsidies Initiative. The Center for Public Policy Alternatives. September 2012.
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 2008. “Sovereign
Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices.” International Working
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. October 2008.
Investment Stabilization Fund 2016. “Home.” Investment Stabilization Fund.
Web. http://www.isfoman.com/About.aspx (Accessed 16 April 2016)
Investopedia. 2016. “The Importance of Diversification.” Investopedia. Web.
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/02/111502.asp (Accessed 20 April 2016)
Jannesen, Nirmala. “Kuwait ruling family member sentenced for embezzlement.”
Gulf News Kuwait. 27 December 2004. Web. 15 January 2016.
Kaplan, Michael. “Could Saudi-Iran Tensions Destabilize Bahrain? Unrest Sparks
Protests in Sectarian-Divided Gulf State.” International Business Times. 4 January 2016.
Web. http://www.ibtimes.com/could-saudi-iran-tensions-destabilize-bahrain-unrestsparks-protests-sectarian-2248342 (Accessed 4 April 2016)
Kern, Steffen. 2009. “Sovereign Wealth Funds – state investments during the
financial crisis.” Deutsche Bank Research. July 2009.
Kessler, Oren. “Call it ‘Fail Jazeera’ – why the network is imploding.” New York
Post. 21 May 2015.
Khatinoglu, Dalga. 2015. “Reasons for Iran to focus on South Pars gas field.”
Trend New Agency. 29 August 2015.Web.
http://en.trend.az/business/energy/2428192.html (Accessed 13 April 2016)
Kinninmont, Jane. 2012. “Kuwait’s Parliament: An Experiment in SemiDemocracy.” Chatham House. Middle East and North Africa Programme 2012/2013.
August 2012.
Knoema. 2015.“Breakeven Price: Saudi Arabia.” Knoema. 23 December 2015.
Web. http://knoema.com/vhzbeig/oil-statistics-production-costs-breakeven-price
(Accessed 4 April 2016)

85

KPMG. “Sovereign Wealth Funds 2014.” KPMG. 2014. Web. 28 December
2015.
Kuwait Investment Authority. 2015a. “History.” Web.
http://www.kia.gov.kw/en/ABOUTKIA/Pages/Overview.aspx (Accessed 19 December
2015)
Kuwait Investment Authority. 2016b. “About KIA.” Kuwait Investment
Authority. Web. http://www.kia.gov.kw/en/ABOUTKIA/Pages/MissionVision.aspx#
(Accessed 28 January 2016)
Kuwait Investment Authority 2016c. “Governance Structure.” Kuwait Investment
Authority. http://www.kia.gov.kw/en/Pages/orgStruct.aspx (Accessed 28 January 2016)
Kuwait Investment Authority. 2016d. Law Decree No. 106 for the year 1976
concerning the Reserves for Future Generations. Articles 1-3.
http://www.kia.gov.kw/en/Pages/KIAFGF.aspx (Accessed 26 January 2016)
Linkedin. 2016. “Human Resource Development Fund.” Linkedin. Web.
https://www.linkedin.com/company/hrdf (Accessed 4 July 2016)
Locke, Suzanne. 2008. “Masdar City: Fast Facts.” Meed. 17 February 2008.
Lulu, Tahiyya. 2011. “The real story of Bahrain’s divided society.” The Guardian.
3 March 2011. Web. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/03/bahrainsunnis-shia-divided-society (Accessed 8 April 2016)
Mabon, Simon. “The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry.” Middle East
Policy Council, Volume XIX, Number 2. Summer 2012. Print.
Marshall, Andrew. 1997. “Kuwait plan to sell 180m BP shares.” The Independent.
14 May 1997. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/kuwait-plan-to-sell-170mbp-shares-1261625.html (Accessed 28 January 2016)
Martinez, Javi. “La Audiencia Nacional condena al ex vicepresidente de KIO a
pagar 46 millones al Grupo Torres.” El Mundo. 6 May 2015. Web.
http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2015/06/05/5571b07346163fa13f8b457e.html
(Accessed 11 January 2016.
Masters, Jonathan. 2013.“ Foreign Investment and U.S. National Security.” CFR
Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. 27 September 2013. Web.
http://www.cfr.org/foreign-direct-investment/foreign-investment-us-nationalsecurity/p31477 (Accessed 2 April 2016.)
McLannahan, Ben. “Qatar Sovereign Wealth Fund suffers $12 bn paper loss.”
Financial Times. 28 September 2015. Web. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9fd05f84-662211e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5.html#axzz3n21UX6hQ (Accessed 11 April 2016)
86

Micklethwait, Joh, Glen Carey, Alaa Shahine, Matthew. 2016. “Saudi Arabia
Plans $2 Trillion Megafund for Post-Oil Era: Deputy Crown Prince.” Bloomberg. 1 April
2016. Web. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-01/saudi-arabia-plans-2trillion-megafund-to-dwarf-all-its-rivals (Accessed 4 April 2016)
Mideast Law. 2016. “Doing Business in Saudi Arabia.” Ali & Partners. Mideast
Law. Web. http://www.mideastlaw.com/middle_eastern_laws_saudi_arabia.html
(Accessed 17 February 2016)
Mills, Robin. “Pioneering Bahrain finds itself reliant on Saudi largesse.” The
National - Abu Dhabi. 2 May 2012. Web. http://www.thenational.ae/business/industryinsights/energy/pioneering-bahrain-finds-itself-reliant-on-saudi-largesse (Accessed 4
April 2016)
Ministry of Transport & Communications. 2016. “Logistics.” Sultanate of Oman
– Ministry of Transport & Communications. Accessed 16 April 2016.
Morgan Stanley. 2007. “How Big Could Sovereign Wealth Funds Be By 2015?”
Morgan Stanley Research Global. 3 May 2007.
Mubadala. 2016a. “Who We Are: Overview.” Mubadala. Web.
https://www.mubadala.com/en/who-we-are/overview (Accessed 6 February 2016)
Mubadala. 2016b. “Who We Are: Vision, Mission, and Values.” Mubadala. Web.
https://www.mubadala.com/en/who-we-are/vision-mission-values (Accessed 6 February
2016)
Mumtalakat. 2014. “Annual Report 2014.” Mumtalakat. Kingdom of Bahrain.
2014. Manama. Print.
Muscat Securities Market. 2016. “History.” Muscat Securities Market. Web.
https://www.msm.gov.om/ (Accessed 15 April 2016)
Naar, Ismaeel. “What’s all the beef about Bahrain’s subsidy cuts?” Al Arabiya
News. 25 September 2015.Web.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2015/09/25/What-s-all-the-beef-aboutBahrain-s-subsidy-cuts-.html (Accessed 7 April 2016)
Nasdaq 2016. “Apple Stock Data.” Nasdaq. Web.
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/aapl (Accessed 4 April 2016)
Natural Gas Europe. 2015. “Iran, Qatar in competition over world’s biggest gas
field.” Natural Gas Europe. 23 December 2015. Web.
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/iran-qatar-in-competition-over-worlds-biggest-gasfield-27264 (Accessed 13 April 2016)

87

Office of the United States Trade Representative 2016. “Oman Free Trade
Agreement.” Office of the United States Trade Representative. Executive Office of the
President. https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta (Accessed 14
April 2016)
Oman Arab Bank. 2016. “Oman’s Ninth Five-Year Development Plan.” Oman
Arab Bank. Accessed 16 April 2016.
Oman Info. 2016. “The Government and State Institutions of Oman.” Oman Info.
Sultanate of Oman. Web. http://www.omaninfo.com/oman/government-and-stateinstitutions-oman.asp (Accessed 16 April 2016)
Orpic. 2016a. “Projects: Liwa Plastics Industries Complex.” Orpic. Web.
http://www.orpic.om/orpics-business/projects/liwa-plastics-project (Accessed 14 April
2016)
Orpic 2016b.“Our Company.” Orpic. Web. http://www.orpic.om/about-us/ourcompany (Accessed 13 April 2016)
Oxford Business Group. 2010. “The Report: Oman.” Oxford Business Group.
2010. Print
Oxford Business Group. 2015. “The Report: Bahrain.” Oxford Business Group.
2015. Print.
Oxford Business Group. 2016. “Income Breakdown: A look at the government’s
main revenue streams.” UAE: Dubai Report. Oxford Business Group.
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/income-breakdown-lookgovernment%E2%80%99s-main-revenue-streams (Accessed 5 February 2016.)
Persian Gulf Fund. 2016. “Qatar – the biggest exporter of liquid gas in the world.”
Persian Gulf Fund. Web. http://persiangulffund.com/qatar-the-biggest-exporter-of-liquidgas-in-the-world/ (Accessed 14 April 2016)
Puko, Timothy. “Oil Prices Rise as Panic Eases.” The Wall Street Journal. 22
April 2016. Accessed 22 April 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-prices-gain-onoutput-declines-1461316877
Qatar Investment Authority. 2016. “About Us.” Qatar Investment Authority.
Web. http://www.qia.qa/AboutUs/Pages/Our-Mission.aspx (Accessed 11 April 2016)
Qatar Foundation. 2016. “About Qatar Foundation: Vision.” Qatar Foundation.
We. https://www.qf.org.qa/about/about (Accessed 10 April 2016)
Railways Africa 2016. “Progress in Oman.” Railways Africa. 28 January 2016.
Web. http://www.railwaysafrica.com/news/progress-in-oman

88

Real Times. 2015. “Smart Cities in the Middle East: from buzz to business.” Real
Times. 25 June 2015. Web. http://www.orangebusiness.com/en/magazine/solutions/smart-cities-in-the-middle-east-from-buzz-tobusiness (Accessed 12 April 2016)
Reuters. 2008. “Factbox - Kuwait’s KIA: history, holdings and strategy.” Reuters.
15 January 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/citigroup-kia-idUSL1517206420080115
(Accessed 1 February 2016)
Reuters. 2015. “Kuwait sovereign fund may sell assets to cover deficit – report.”
Reuters. 11 October 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/kuwait-sovereign-fundsidUSL8N12B0CK20151011#GQr4dLRVXiucSqhu.97 (Accessed 1 February 2016)
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner. 2001. “The Curse of Natural
Resources.” European Economic Review 45, no. 4-6 (2001): 827-38. doi:10.1016/s00142921(01)00125-8.
SAMA. 2016. “Historical Preview.” Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Web.
http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/About/Pages/SAMAHistory.aspx (Accessed 19 April
2016)
SAMA. 1960. “First Annual Report 1380 A.H.” Saudi Arabia Monetary
Authority. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 1960. Print.
SAMA. 1964. “Fourth Annual Report 1384 A.H.” Saudi Arabia Monetary
Authority. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 1964. Print.
SAMA. 1968. “Eighth Annual Report 1388 A.H.” Saudi Arabia Monetary
Authority. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 1968. Print.
SAMA. 1972. “Twelfth Annual Report 1392 A.H.” Saudi Arabia Monetary
Authority. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 1972. Print.
SAMA. 1976. “Sixteenth Annual Report 1396 A.H.” Saudi Arabia Monetary
Authority. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 1976. Print.
SAMA. 1980. “Twentieth Annual Report 1400 A.H.” Saudi Arabia Monetary
Authority. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 1980. Print.
Sanati, Cyrus. 2016. “Why a Saudi Aramco IPO Makes Absolutely No Sense for
Saudi Arabia.” Fortune Magazine. 13 January 2016. http://fortune.com/2016/01/13/whya-saudi-aramco-ipo-makes-absolutely-no-sense-for-saudi-arabia/ (Accessed 2 April 2016)
Saudi Aramco. 2016. “About: History.” Saudi Arabian Oil Company. Web.
http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home/about/history.html (Accessed 19 April 2016)

89

Seznec, Jena-Francois. 2008. “The Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds: Myths and
Reality.” Middle East Policy Council Summer 2008. Middle East Policy, Vol. XV, No. 2,
Summer 2008.
Slade, Christina. “Al Jazeera: How TV channel helped shape the Middle East.”
CNN News. 27 June 2014. Web. http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/26/opinion/opinion-egyptal-jazeera/ (Accessed 12 April 2016)
Smith, Kevin. “2015: A key year for Oman Rail.” International Railway Journal.
11 March 2015. Web. http://www.railjournal.com/index.php/middle-east/2015-a-keyyear-for-oman-rail.html
Smith, Matt. “Oil Prices Show No Sign of Weakness After Doha.” OilPrice.com .
22 April 2016. Accessed 22 April 2016. http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/OilPrices-Show-No-Sign-Of-Weakness-After-Doha.html
Sovereign Wealth Center. 2016a. “Snapshot: Future Generations Reserve Fund
(New). Sovereign Wealth Center. Sovereign Investor Institute. Web.
http://www.sovereignwealthcenter.com/fund/43/Future-Generations-Reserve-FundNew.html#.Vx1AoPkrJQI (Accessed 8 April 2016)
Sovereign Wealth Center 2016b. “Oman Investment Fund Profile.” Sovereign
Wealth Center. Web. http://www.sovereignwealthcenter.com/fund/22/Oman-InvestmentFund.html#.VxbD5_krJQI (Accessed 15 April 2016)
The Sovereign Wealth Fund Initiative. 2011. “Fund Profile: Kuwait Investment
Authority.” The Sovereign Wealth Fun Initiative. Center for Emerging Market
Enterprises at the Fletcher School. 2011.
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 2016a. “What is a SWF?” Web.
http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund/ (accessed 29 December 2015)
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 2016b. “Linaburg-Maduell Transparency
Index.” SWFInstitute.com http://www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-research/linaburgmaduell-transparency-index/ (Accessed 2 February 2016)
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 2016c. “Abu Dhabi Investment Authority.”
Sovereing Wealth Fund Institute. Web. http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/abu-dhabiinvestment-authority/ (Accessed 3 February 2016)
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 2016d. “Public Investment Fund.” Sovereign
Wealth Fund Institute. Web. http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/public-investment-fund/
(Accessed 4 April 2016)
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 2016e. “Mumtalakat Holdings Fund.” Sovereign
Wealth Fund Institute. Web. http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/mumtalakat-holdings/
(Accessed 8 April 2016)
90

Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 2016f. “Kuwait Investment Authority.”
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Web. http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/kuwaitinvestment-authority/ (Accessed 19 January 2016)
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 2016g. “Qatar Investment Authority.”
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Web. http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/qatarinvestment-authority/ (Accessed 11 April 2016)
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 2016h. “Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings by
Assets Under Management.” Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Web.
http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/ (Accessed 11 April 2016)
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 2016i. “Oman Investment Fund.” Sovereign
Wealth Fund Institute. Web. http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/oif/ (Accessed 15 April
2016)
State General Reserve Fund 2016. “About SGRF.” State General Reserve Fund.
Sultanate of Oman. Web. 2016. http://www.sgrf.gov.om/about.html (Accessed 16 April)
Times of Oman. 2015. “Oman’s eighth five year plan investment expenditure
touches OMR12b.” Times of Oman. 7 March 2015. Web.
http://timesofoman.com/article/48833/Business/Oman's-eighth-five-year-planinvestment-expenditure-touches-OMR12b (Accessed 15 April 2016)
Tipitino, Demic. 2011. “Do Bilateral FTAs Increase Trade? Case Study: Oman,
Bahrain, and their US-FTAs.” Honors Thesis. University of Oregon. June 2011.
Townsend, Mark. 2015. “Kuwait: A Race for Economic Diversification.” Kuwait
Country Report. Global Finance Magazine. 9 January 2015.
https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/january-2015/kuwait-race-economic-diversification
(Accessed 4 February 2016)
Transparency International. 2016. “Country Profile: Saudi Arabia.” Transparency
International. Web. https://www.transparency.org/country/#SAU (Accessed 4 March
2016)
Tremlett, Giles. “Former Kuwait Investment Executives face trial in Spain.”
United Press International. 11 February 1994. Web.
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1994/02/11/Former-Kuwait-Investment-executives-facetrial-in-Spain/7291760942800/ (Accessed 10 February 2016)
U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2013. “Total Primary Energy
Production.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Web.
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#?ord=CR&cy=2013&v=H&vo=0&s
o=0&io=0&start=1980&end=2013&vs=INTL.44-1-BHRQBTU.A&c=00008&pa=004000001&f=A&ug=g&ct=0&tl_type=p&tl_id=44-A&s=
(Accessed 14 March 2016)
91

U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2016a. “Saudi Arabia’s Key Energy
Statistics.” U.S. Energy Information Administration.
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=SAU (Accessed 14 February
2016)
U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2016b. “Country Overview: Bahrain.”
U.S. Energy Information Administration.
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=BHR (Accessed 8 April 2016)
Wheeling Jesuit University. “Middle East: Economic Growth and Decline.”
Wheeling Jesuit University – Center for Educational Technologies.
http://www.cotf.edu/earthinfo/meast/MEeco.html (accessed 20 February 2016)
World Bank. 2015. “Ease of doing business index.” World Development
Indicators. The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ
(Accessed 5 February 2016)
World Bank. 2016a. “Industry, value added (% of GDP).” World Development
Indicators. The World Bank. Web.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS (Accessed 5 February 2016)
World Bank. 2016b. “Services, value added (% of GDP).” World Development
Indicators. The World Bank. Web.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TETC.ZS (Accessed 5 February 2016)
World Bank. 2016c. “Agriculture, value added (% of GDP).” World Development
Indicators. The World Bank. Web.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZSZS (Accessed 5 February 2016)
World Bank. 2016d. “Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP).” World Development
Indicators. The World Bank. Web.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.BAL.CASH.GD.ZS (Accessed 16 February 2016)
The World Factbook. 2016a. “Country Comparison: Crude Oil – Production.”
The World Factbook. The Central Intelligence Agency. Web.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html
(Accessed 15 February 2016)
The World Factbook. 2016b. “Country Comparison: Crude Oil – Exports.” The
World Factbook. The Central Intelligence Agency. Web.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2242rank.html
(Accessed 15 February 2016)
Wright, Chris. 2015. “Has the Qatar Investment Authority Really Lost $12
Billion?” Forbes. 29 September 2015. Web
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2015/09/29/has-the-qatar-investment-authorityreally-lost-12-billion/#6a58697f7b9b (Accessed 12 April 2016)
92

93

